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THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE

ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT:
MORRISON V. OLSON
Editor's Note
As this symposium began to take shape it became apparent
that the Supreme Court would shortly be addressing many of the
constitutional questions raised by the use of independent counsel
through the Court's considerationof Morrison v. Olson.1 Recognizing the critical nature of the Court's deliberations in this case, the
editors concluded that this symposium would be incomplete without
commentary and debate of the issues with which the Court must
deal. The editors contacted the principal parties involved in the
case; they suggested that the best discussion of these issues could be
found in the briefs which had been submitted to the D.C. Circuit.
The parties noted that while the D.C. Circuit had already rendered
its decision, many of the same arguments considered by the circuit
court, and discussed by these briefs, would be reexamined by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, in the interest of presenting what are
perhaps the most cogent arguments for and against the Ethics in
Government Act,2 the Hofstra Law Review reprints below the brief
filed on behalf of the Appellee, and the brieffiled on behalf of the
United States as amicus curiae in In re Sealed Case.3

1. 56 U.S.L.W. 3568 (Feb. 22, 1988)(probable jurisdiction noted). For the circuit court
decision, see In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2.

28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982).

3. For further discussion of the circuit court decision, see Gressman, Introduction: A
Symposium on Special Prosecutionsand the Role of the Independent Counsel, 16
REv. 1 (1987).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLEE*

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1982 two Subcommittees of the House of Representatives
subpoenaed documents from the Environmental Protection Agency.
The Department of Justice advised the President that certain of the
documents were subject to a claim of executive privilege because
their release could imperil ongoing EPA enforcement actions. Acting
on the Department's advice, the President directed the Administrator of EPA to withhold the "enforcement sensitive" documents, and
she did so.
There ensued a serious constitutional confrontation between the
legislative and executive branches. The House voted to hold the Administrator in contempt. The United States Attorney took no steps to
prosecute the contempt. The Department of Justice sued the House
of Representatives seeking a declaration that the President's claim of
privilege was valid.'
It later turned out that some of the withheld documents contained evidence of political manipulation of the so-called
"Superfund" hazardous waste site clean-up program. The claim of
executive privilege was abandoned, the Administrator resigned, and
one high-level EPA official responsible for Superfund program administration was convicted of making a false statement.
The House Committee on the Judiciary undertook an investigation of the role of the Justice Department in the EPA documents
controversy. During that investigation, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Theodore B. Olson testified on
March 10, 1983, before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Monopolies
and Commercial Law. The Department later produced documents
responsive to requests from the Committee. For a substantial period
of time the Department withheld from production both handwritten
notes of participants in the controversy and chronologies prepared
within the Department, without informing the Committee that it was
doing so. Once their existence was discovered by the Committee,
* This brief was filed in In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The only
changes made were those necessary to conform the brief to Law Review style.
I. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). The
district court dismissed the action.
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these items were also turned over.
The Committee published an extensive report of its investigation
on December 11, 1985.2 It asserted, inter alia, that Mr. Olson had
testified untruthfully in several respects before the Subcommittee on
March 10, and that former Deputy Attorney General Edward C.
Schmults and former Assistant Attorney General for the Lands and
Natural Resources Division Carol E. Dinkins had engaged in acts
which obstructed the Committee's inquiry. Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., forwarded the report to the Attorney General on
December 12, 1985, with a formal request that the latter seek the
appointment of an independent counsel under Title VI of the Ethics
in Government Act.3
At the direction of the Attorney General, the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division conducted the preliminary investigation required by section 592(a)(1) of the Act. In a lengthy and
careful report, the Public Integrity Section concluded that the appointment of an independent counsel was warranted with respect to
the conduct of Messrs. Olson and Schmults and Ms. Dinkins. 5 Most
high-level members of the Criminal Division recused themselves
from the review process because of their relationship with the matter
or the individuals involved. Invoking a "rule of necessity," John C.
Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, reviewed the matter
and recommended that only Mr. Olson be referred for further investigation by an independent counsel.6
Because so many high-level Department officials had recused
themselves, the Attorney General asked then-United States Attorney
for the District of Massachusetts William F. Weld to act as his Special Assistant in the matter and review the Criminal Division's recommendations. Mr. Weld recommended the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the conduct of Messrs. Olson and
Schmults, but not Ms. Dinkins.
2. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. INVESTIGATION
OF THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE WITHHOLDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM CONGRESS IN 1982-83, H.R. Rep. No. 99-435 (1985)
(hereinafter "Committee report").
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(1)(1982).
5. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE REPORT OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION (Apr. 4, 1986) 151-52 [hereinafter "Public Integrity report"].
6. Memorandum from John C. Keeney to William F. Weld 8 (Apr. 4, 1986).
7. Memorandum from William F. Weld to Attorney General 1, 4, 5, 8 (April 4, 1986).
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On April 10, 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese III applied
to the Special Division of this Court for the Purpose of Appointing
Independent Counsels (the "Division") for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate Mr. Olson. 8 Overruling the views of
the professional prosecutors in the Public Integrity Section and his
own Special Assistant in the matter, the Attorney General concluded
that there were "no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution [was] warranted," 9 with respect to either Mr.
Schmults or Ms. Dinkins. 10 Regarding Mr. Olson, the Attorney General requested that the independent counsel be given jurisdiction to
investigate whether Mr. Olson gave false testimony to the Subcommittee "and any other matter related to that allegation."1 1
On April 23, 1986, the Division appointed James C. McKay as
Independent Counsel to investigate
whether testimony of Mr. Theodore Olson and his revision of such
testimony on March 10, 1983, violated either 18 U.S.C. § 1505 or
§ 1001, or any other provision of federal law [and] any other allegation or evidence of violation of any Federal criminal law by Theodore Olson developed during . . . and connected with or arising
out of that investigation . ... 2
After Mr. McKay resigned, the Division on May 29, 1986, appointed Alexia Morrison to replace him.
Following the initial stages of the investigation, Independent
8.
ING

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) REGARD-

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT,

April 10, 1986, at I [hereinafter

REPORT OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL].
9. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)(1982).
10, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 22, 47. In both cases, the
Attorney General concluded on the basis of the preliminary investigation alone that the individuals lacked the requisite "criminal intent" to obstruct the Judiciary Committee's
investigation.

11.

Specifically, the Attorney General requested that the independent counsel be em-

powered to investigate

[w]hether the conduct of former Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson in giving testimony at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Judiciary Committee on March 10, 1983, and later revising that
testimony, regarding the completeness of the Office of Legal Counsel's response to
the Judiciary Committee's request for OLC documents, and regarding his knowledge of EPA's willingness to turn over certain

disputed documents to Congress, vio-

lated 18 U.S.C. § 1505, § 1001, or any other provision of federal criminal law.

Id. at 2-3. He also proposed that the independent counsel have jurisdiction to investigate "any
other matter related to that allegation." Id. at 11.
12. Order of April 23, 1986, No. 86-1, at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div.).
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Counsel concluded that the conduct of Mr. Schmults and Ms.
Dinkins required further scrutiny. On November 14, 1986, Independent Counsel applied to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 594(e) for referral of allegations regarding Mr. Schmults and
Ms. Dinkins as "related matters." On December 17, 1986, the Attorney General declined the requested referral.
On January 13, 1987, Independent Counsel sought referral of
the Dinkins and Schmults matters from the Division. The Attorney
General opposed the referral, as did Mr. Schmults and Ms. Dinkins,
participating as amicus curiae. On April 2, 1987, the Division ruled
that the Attorney General's determination that there were no reasonable grounds for further investigation of Mr. Schmults and Ms.
Dinkins was final and unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. section
592(b)(1), and hence that it had no power to make the requested
referral under section 594(e). 3 The Division went on, however, to
state that the existing grant of jurisdiction authorized an investigation of whether Mr. Olson may have participated with others, including Mr. Schmults and Ms. Dinkins, in an unlawful scheme to
obstruct the Committee's inquiry.1 4 Independent Counsel has proceeded to conduct the investigation within the framework of the Division's order.
Challenges to the constitutional authority of the Independent
Counsel to proceed were brought in the District Court by three individuals. Those challenges were resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the Act in an opinion by Chief Judge Robinson on July 20,
1987. These appeals ensued. 5
13. In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987).
14. Id. at 47-48.
15. All three appellants challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Appellant in No.
87-5264 raises a separate issue with respect to the scope of Independent Counsel's authority
under the Division's appointing order. This Court ordered the appeals in Nos. 87-5261 and 875265 consolidated, and appellants therein have filed a single brief confined to the constitutional
issues. Appellant's Briefs, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988)[hereinafter Appellant Brief I]. Appellant in No. 87-5264 filed a separate brief addressing both the constitutional issues and the issue of the scope of Independent Counsel's authority. Appellant Brief, In
re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988)[hereinafter Appellant Brief II]. The Department of Justice filed a brief amicus curiae supporting appellants' position on the constitutional
issue. Brief for the Department of Justice, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988)[hereinafter Department of Justice Brief]. Appellee addresses in this brief the constitutional arguments of all three appellants and the Department. A separate brief addressing the
scope of authority issue is being filed by appellee in No. 87-5264.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. The provisions of Title VI of the Ethics Act do not violate
the separation of powers principle. They are a measured and limited
congressional response to the recurring problem of allegations of
criminal misconduct involving high Executive Branch officials, which
inevitably place the Justice Department in a conflict of interest. The
Act does not invade the law enforcement prerogatives of the Executive Branch. It requires a request by the Attorney General before
any independent counsel may be appointed, and its reach is narrowly
limited to the accomplishment of a specific purpose within Congress'
power. The Constitution does not contemplate separate "airtight
compartments" of government. The Act does not prevent the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, but creates a mechanism to permit effective law enforcement
and secure public confidence in the extraordinary cases where the
Justice Department is disabled to act. The Executive Branch has repeatedly acquiesced in this and other measures to achieve the foregoing objectives by divesting itself of law enforcement responsibility in
such cases. Any impact on executive prerogatives is justified by the
overriding need to promote fair and effective law enforcement and
public confidence in the integrity of the enforcement process. To this
end, the limited strictures on the power of the Executive Branch to
remove an independent counsel are appropriate to the functions of
that office and do not improperly aggrandize congressional power.
B. The Constitution permits Congress to vest the power to appoint an independent counsel in a "Court of Law." The independent
counsel, who is appointed temporarily to conduct a single, narrowly
defined, investigation, is an "inferior officer" within the meaning of
art. II, section 2, cl. 2, and thus does not require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. There is no constitutional impediment to the appointment of a prosecutorial official by a court.
C. The power granted to the court to appoint an independent
counsel and define his or her jurisdiction does no violence to the limitations of art. III. The powers of the court derive, not from art. III
alone, but from the Appointments Clause as well. Moreover, those
powers are not inconsistent with art. III, and the functions performed by the court do not differ qualitatively from functions traditionally performed by courts sitting under art. III.
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III.

ARGUMENT

A. The Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act are a Measured CongressionalResponse to a
Significant Law Enforcement Problem, and they do no Violence to
the Separation of Powers Principle
The major thrust of appellants' and the Department's arguments is that the Act is unconstitutional because criminal law enforcement is a "core executive function," no aspect of which may be
taken from the control of the Executive Branch by congressional enactment. This contention has been rejected by every judge who has
opined upon it to date, 6 and by the overwhelming weight of scholarly and practical legal opinion.Y We shall demonstrate that the Act
is a measured and limited response to a real and recurring law enforcement problem, and that it does not impermissibly invade the
sphere of the executive.
1. The Act Is a Measured Response to a Real and Recurring
Law Enforcement Problem.- In passing the Ethics Act, Congress
wrote against a backdrop of Executive Branch scandals from Teapot
Dome to Watergate, in each of which the Department of Justice was
effectively immobilized by an evident conflict of interest.' 8 The Senate Committee gave expression to Congress' conclusion:
The basic purpose of the special prosecutor provisions is to
promote public confidence in the impartial investigation of alleged
wrongdoings by government officials. Prompted by the events of
Watergate, Congress recognized that actual or perceived conflicts
of interest may exist when the Attorney General is called on to
investigate alleged criminal activities by high-level government
officials.
When conflicts exist, or when the public believes there are
16. See In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Deaver,
Criminal No. 87-0096 (D.D.C. May 13, 1987), app. dism., No. 87-3028 (D.C. Cir., June 15,
1987); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 43-46 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987); cf. North v.
Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987)(denying preliminary injunction on ground inter alia
that Act was likely to be upheld as constitutional).
17. For a compendium of legal scholars and eminent practitioners who supported the
independent counsel provisions of the legislation, see Appendix to this Brief (on file at Hofstra
Law Review).
18. For a discussion of the history of major Executive Branch scandals leading to the
passage of the Act, see In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39-43 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987).
Of the eight presidential administrations since World War II, five-those of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter and Reagan-have encountered serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing at the upper echelons of the Executive Branch.
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conflicts, public confidence in the prosecutorial decisions is eroded
if not totally lost. Thus, a statutory mechanism providing for a
temporary special prosecutor is necessary to insulate the Attorney
General from making decisions in these instances.
The Committee believes that the dangers of conflict of interest
were not unique to Watergate, but rather are inherent in our system of government. The Attorney General is a political appointee
of the President, at times close advisor to the President, and a part
of an Administration that may aspire to reelection or have other
political objectives. Thus, an Attorney General may be placed in a
difficult situation when called upon to investigate allegations
against senior Administration officials. Even when an Attorney
General makes totally unbiased decisions in investigating officials,
the public may perceive actions as having political motivations ....
Ironically, there is also a danger that, in other cases, the Attorney
General may bend over backwards to avoid the risk of loss of public confidence in his office, and make a harsh and unfair
prosecutorial decision against a public official.
Historical experience demonstrates that public confidence is
served only when these investigations are conducted by a person
totally outside the control of the Attorney General and senior officials of the Department of Justice. 19
Congress' response to this historical experience, Title VI of the
Ethics Act, is carefully crafted both to preserve a substantial role for
the Attorney General and to limit narrowly the circumstances in
which an independent counsel may be appointed and the scope of the
counsel's powers.
First, the reach of the Act is extremely narrow, and no independent counsel may be appointed without a specific request from the
Attorney General, who may cut the process off at any of several
stages. Upon receipt of information that he determines is "sufficient
to constitute grounds to investigate" possible serious criminal conduct20 by one of the small class of persons covered by the Act, 1 the
Attorney General is directed to conduct a preliminary investigation.2 2 His determination that no preliminary investigation is war19. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 US. CODE CONG. & AD3537, 3540-41 (hereinafter 1982 Senate Report).
20. The Act has no application to allegations of Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)(Supp. III 1985).
21. The coverage of the Act is narrowly limited to persons at the very top echelon of the
Executive Branch. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(1982).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1)(1982).
MIN. NEWS
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ranted is not subject to judicial review. 23 If a preliminary investigation is conducted, the Attorney General is required to seek the
appointment of an independent counsel if he finds "reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted ....,,24 A determination by the Attorney General that no
further investigation or prosecution is warranted, and hence that no
independent counsel should be appointed, is likewise final and unreviewable,25 even at the behest of an independent counsel claiming to
possess newly discovered evidence.26
Once an independent counsel has been appointed, the Executive
Branch retains significant control over the process and its ultimate
outcome.17 Thus the Attorney General may refer "related matters"
to the independent counsel 2 but the Division may not do so without
23. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(1982).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)(1982); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc). Appellants complain that the Act improperly confines the Attorney General's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which will often turn upon a variety of factors beyond the
existence of an evidentiary justification for further proceedings. Appellant Brief II, supra note
15, at 23-24, 34; Department of Justice Brief, supra note 15, at 49. The Act, however, does
not so constrain the Attorney General. It is true that § 592(a)(1) mandates a preliminary
investigation by the Attorney General if the evidence warrants it. However, the standard for
the Attorney General's determination whether to seek the appointment of an independent
counsel at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation ---"whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted"-does not by its
terms confine the Attorney General to a bare consideration of evidentiary justification. Indeed,
§ 592(c)(1) was amended in 1982 to direct the Attorney General in determining whether
further investigation or prosecution is warranted to "comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws."
See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 19, at 3550.
In any event, the reasoning of Dellums, Nathan and Banzhaf renders it virtually inconceivable that an Attorney General's refusal to seek the appointment of an independent counsel
will ever be reviewed and overturned, even when he relies explicitly or implicitly on non-evidentiary factors. Here, for example, the Attorney General overruled the Department's prosecuting professionals and declined to seek the appointment of an independent counsel with respect to Mr. Schmults and Ms. Dinkins purportedly on the basis of a "finding" made at the
investigatory threshold that they lacked "criminal intent," even though the existence vel non of
such intent is ordinarily a matter for inference on the basis of all the evidence at the conclusion of the investigatory process. Yet his determination was treated by the Division as unreviewable. In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 47.
26. In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 47. The Attorney General, by contrast, is empowered to
review newly discovered evidence and make an unreviewable determination whether it justifies
reversing a prior decision not to seek the appointment of an independent counsel. 28 U.S.C. §
592 (c)(2)(1982).
27. For a catalog of the Attorney General's substantial array of powers under the Act,
see In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 45-46.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 594(e)(1982).
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the Attorney General's concurrence . And while the independent
counsel is given most investigative and prosecutorial powers within
the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the Attorney General retains "direction and control" with respect to authorizations for the interception of wire or oral communications. 3" More important, the Attorney
General has the sole power (other than the impeachment process) to
remove an independent counsel, though he may do so only for "good
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition
that substantially impairs the performance of such independent
counsel's duties."3 " And the President retains the exclusive and unfettered constitutional authority, pursuant to Article II, section 2,
pardon the subject of an investigation at any stage of
clause 1,32 to
33
the process.
The statutory powers of an independent counsel, while admittedly (and necessarily) broad within the sphere of his or her jurisdiction,34 are carefully circumscribed. He or she has no authority to
investigate or prosecute beyond the confines of the specified jurisdiction and must "except where not possible, comply with the written or
other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 31 Public accountability of an independent counsel is ensured by the requirement that he or she submit
a comprehensive report of the investigation to the Division, 6 and by
37
the provision for congressional oversight of his or her activities.
29. In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 47.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1982).
31. Id. § 596(a)(1).
32. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260-66 (1974).
33. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a),(c),(d),(g)(1982).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1982). Appellants' complaints that independent counsels are not
in a position to give weight to the full range of factors normally encompassed within the concept of "prosecutorial discretion," Appellant Brief II, supra note 15, at 16-17; Appellant Brief
II, supra note 15, at 25, lack substance. An independent counsel has authority under 28
U.S.C. § 594(g) to decline investigation or prosecution pursuant to the Department's written
or established policies, which provide guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 5-15 (1980). The exercise of such discretion within the Department's guidelines by Justice Department Attorneys is
in any event a highly individualized process. And the history under the statute hardly suggests
that independent counsels feel pressured to bring prosecutions where the Department ordinarily would not. There have been at least nine publicly identified independent counsels since the
passage of the Act in 1978, and possibly others whose appointment has not been made public,
see 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(3) (1982), and so far only two indictments have been brought.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(1982).
37. Id. § 595(d). Appellants complain that the Act's provision for congressional oversight of an independent counsel's activities, which is plainly designed to secure the accountabil-
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And in addition to the Attorney General's power of removal, the office of the independent counsel automatically terminates when he or
she notifies the Attorney General that the investigation is completed,38 or earlier if the Division on its own motion or that of the
Attorney General determines that the investigation is substantially
completed.3 9
The Act thus authorizes the creation of a temporary office in
narrowly defined circumstances where the normal prosecuting authorities are disabled by a conflict of interest. The office may only be
created upon the request of the Attorney General, and its jurisdiction is closely confined by the order creating it. The office terminates
when its purpose has been accomplished, and the accountability of
its occupant is assured by the Attorney General's power of removal,
the power of the Division to terminate the office and the power of the
Congress to conduct appropriate oversight proceedings.
2. The Act Does Not Invade the Law Enforcement Prerogatives
of the Executive Branch. - a. The Constitution Does Not Contemplate Three Separate "Airtight Compartments." - The position of
appellants and the Department rests upon a rigid and formalistic
view of the separation of powers. "Law enforcement" is invoked as a
talisman to shield absolute executive prerogative from any control by
the legislature or the judiciary. This approach to the separation of
powers is "inconsistent with the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the [Supreme] Court, and the contemporary realities of our
political system."'40 The Court has "squarely rejected the argument
that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority
between the three branches,"41 and with it the "archaic view of the
separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of
' '42
government.
Indeed, the vision of the Framers was far more sophisticated
ity they claim is lacking, somehow renders the counsel a creature of the Congress and trenches
upon the law enforcement prerogatives of the Executive Branch. Appellant Brief I, supra note

15, at 2, 34, 38-39. The argument is wide of the mark. The law enforcement activities of the
Department of Justice are the subject of continuing oversight by the Judiciary Committees of
both the House and the Senate. And the Supreme Court has firmly upheld under art. I the
broadest exercise of congressional oversight in this field, including the power to inquire into the
executive's reasons for prosecuting or declining prosecution in specific cases. McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(1)(1982).
39. Id. § 596(b)(2).
40. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977).
41. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)).
42. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. at 443.
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and common-sensical than that contended for by appellants.
Madison, a principal architect of this aspect of the Constitution, argued that the separation of powers "does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other."43 To the contrary, he urged, that "unless
these departments be so far connected and blended as to give each a
constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which
the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained."" Interpreting the words of Montesquieu on this subject, Madison contended that
he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning...
can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of

one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of
a free constitution are subverted. 5
From this practical and undogmatic beginning there has evolved
a pragmatic approach to the analysis of separation of powers issues.
This approach received its most comprehensive and oft-quoted statement from Justice Jackson:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
43.

THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison)(Lodge ed. 1888).

44. Id.
45. Id. No. 47 at 302 (emphasis in original). Two scholars have recently pointed out:
[M]ost of the Framers conceded that a rigid separation of powers was unacceptable ....

Therefore, instead of separated powers--shared powers. Instead of divided gov-

ernment-mixed government. Accordingly, Madison was forced to reinterpret Montesquieu, to find in his work support for the idea of shared powers ....
The product was a constitution, not of separated powers, but of "separated institutions sharing powers." The institutions of government were formally separated
by the stricture that no member of one branch could simultaneously hold office in
another. To an extent, the powers of government were separated as well: the three
branches were allocated particular functions over which they held primary responsibility. But most importantly, powers were shared. Dual concurrence, for example
was required for policymaking ....
As a description of the actual functioning of government, then, the term "separation of powers" is quite misleading. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the constitutional commitment to this doctrine has been, at best, "vague and uncertain."
Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROa. 1, 2-3 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."6

Thus the Court has recently reiterated that "the Constitution by no
means contemplates total separation of each of these three essential

branches of Government," 47 and that the Framers were practical
statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise
saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.48
The Supreme Court has articulated a two-pronged test for "determining whether [an Act of Congress] disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches. 14 9 First,
the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must
we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
48. Id. Scholars have noted and approved the Court's avoidance of dogma in its resolution of separation of powers questions. See, e.g., P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 342-43 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-17 (1978). Noting the
many places where the text of the Constitution requires that one branch take part in the
functioning of another (e.g., presidential approval of legislation), Professor Tribe remarked:
"Although the late nineteenth century Supreme Court expressed a wooden notion that each
branch must 'be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no
other,' that view has since been widely dismissed as indefensibly extreme and largely beside
the point." Id. at 16 (footnote omitted). The rise of what Justice White has called "the modern
administrative state," INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984 (White, J.,
dissenting), which invests
administrative agencies with powers traditionally exercised by all three branches, has led some
scholars to question the continued utility of the traditional separation of powers model. E.
CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 2-3 (1978). While the Supreme
Court has never suggested abandonment of the concept of separation of powers, it has been at
pains to make it clear that the doctrine does not prevent administrative agencies from exercising mixed powers which partake of the traditional powers of the three branches. E.g., CFTC v.
Schor, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3257-61 (1986); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
628 (1935); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3188 n.4 (1986)(distinguishing cases where
agencies exercise independent powers from those in which congress retains direct control).
49. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. at 443.
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Congress.50

The Ethics Act satisfies both prongs of the Nixon test.
b. The Act Does Not Prevent the Executive Branch From Accomplishing its Constitutionally Assigned Functions.- It is thus
clear that the mere description of a function as involving "law enforcement" does not automatically place it within a sphere of exclusive Executive Branch prerogative. 1 Once this is understood, there
can be no serious claim that the provisions of the Act impermissibly
invade the province of the Executive Branch. 2
As we have shown, the Act is narrowly tailored to achieve a
limited objective-the creation of a law enforcement mechanism
50. Id. (citations omitted). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106
S. Ct. 3245, 3261 (1986) (focusing on potential for "aggrandizement of congressional power at
the expense of a coordinate branch").
51. E.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2131-35
(1987)(approving judicial appointment of private counsel to prosecute criminal contempts of
court); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (approving law enforcement functions of the FTC); ICC v. Chatsworth Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 347 F.2d 821, 822
(7th Cir. 1965); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3206-07 & n.3 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting). This Court held in National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587,
604 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that the President's duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully
executed ... does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the
Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary." See also Kendall v. United States, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612-13 (1838)(stating that the obligation imposed on the President to see
the laws faithfully exectited does not imply a power to forbid their execution). Of course, the
President's exercise of his law enforcement powers is constrained by a wide range of congressional and judicial prescriptions, including, for example, the wiretap provisions of the Omnibus
Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1982 & Supp. 1986), and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
52. Appellants' reliance on statements in such cases as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 693, and United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring), to the effect that the decision whether to prosecute a criminal case is committed to the exclusive discretion of the executive, Appellant Brief I, supra note
15, at 11-12; Appellant Brief II, supra 15, at 19-20; Department of Justice Brief, supra note
15, at 25-27, is misplaced. These dicta import nothing more than the obvious proposition that
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in particular cases is an "executive" or "law enforcement" function, as opposed to a legislative or judicial function. Neither the statements themselves nor, more importantly, the cases in which they were made, speak even remotely to the
question whether Congress may lodge the performance of that "executive" function in an officer insulated from at least some degree of Executive Branch control in the extraordinary
circumstances addressed by the Act. Cox merely held that a court may not compel a federal
prosecutor to sign an indictment and proceed with a case by use of its contempt power. Of
course, the Act does not purport to give any judicial body the power to force the initiation of a
prosecution. And in Nixon the Supreme Court upheld, over the President's constitutional protest, the power of a special prosecutor appointed with solemn assurances of independence from
presidential control to compel the President himself to turn over to a grand jury tapes of his
confidential conversations with his aides. Appellants can hardly take comfort from such a
holding.
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where the Executive Branch is disabled to act by virtue of a conflict
of interest. Its reach is modest, and it preserves substantial Executive
Branch power even within its compass. It was enacted only after repeated historical demonstrations of the inability of the Executive
Branch to police its own top echelons in a manner consistent with
public confidence in the integrity of law enforcement. To deny in
these circumstances the power of Congress to create this mechanism
would be to exalt a never-accepted dogma to a point where it interferes with the nation's "capab[ility] of governing itself effectively." 53
i. The Actions of the Executive Branch Belie the Notion That
Its Functions Have Been Disrupted. - Under the Constitution the
President is an active participant in the legislative process. Article I,
section 7, clause 2, provides that no Act of Congress may become
law without his signature, unless both Houses vote by two-thirds majority to override his veto. Presidents have routinely vetoed legislation which they deemed invasive of their constitutional
prerogatives.54
Title VI of the Ethics Act has been signed into law, not just by
one President, but by two, including President Reagan. When President Carter signed the original Act in 1978, he not only raised no
protest that it deprived him of his rightful constitutional authority,
he declared: "I'm hopeful, of course, that this authority will be
rarely needed, but I believe it is necessary in response to the lessons
that we have learned to the embarrassment of our country in the
past." 55 President Reagan does not appear to have issued a statement when he signed the extension and amendment of the statute in
1982, but he likewise failed to protest what the Department of Justice now asserts is a fundamental tear in the constitutional fabric.
Indeed, the Department of Justice testified on behalf of the Executive Branch in favor of the legislation in 1977:
The Department has no objections to the manner in which the appointment process is initiated, the method of judicial appointment,
or the restrictions placed on the Executive's power of removal over
the special prosecutor. .

.

. [O]n balance, we think that the ex-

traordinary circumstances which would warrant a resort to a spe53. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 121.
54. To cite but two famous examples, President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Act,
which was passed over his veto, on this ground, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1285 (Oct. 29,
1973), and President Jackson did the same with the second Bank of the United States legislation, see A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 90-91 (1950).
55. 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1854, 1855 (Oct. 26, 1978).
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cial prosecutor would also justify granting him the measure of independence provided."

We recognize, of course, that cases since Marbury v.
Madison,57 hold that the concurrence of the legislative and executive
branches in the constitutionality of a law is not binding on the judiciary, and we do not mean to suggest that the acquiescence of Presi-

dents Carter and Reagan in the Act's passage forecloses judicial inquiry. However, the constitutional process affords the Executive
Branch ample opportunity to make its objections known and their,
weight felt. Thus we submit that where the question is whether a
statute impermissibly strips the Executive Branch of its fundamental
prerogatives, the executive's assent is entitled to substantial weight
in the judicial analysis." As the Supreme Court put it in rejecting
another claim of congressional invasion of executive prerogative,
"[t]he Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation
when President Ford signed the Act into law, and the administration
of

President

Carter
59

.

.

.

vigorously

supports

.

.

.

its

constitutionality."
The actions of the Executive Branch are relevant in yet another
way. Presidents since Calvin Coolidge have explicitly recognized
their disability to act in criminal matters affecting high administration officials and have taken action, sometimes pursuant to congressional enactment, to divest themselves of law enforcement responsibility and authority in such matters.60 Indeed, the current Attorney
56. Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 555 Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 15-17 (1977) (testimony of Acting Ass't
Atty. Gen. John M. Harmon).
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 254-59 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
59. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. at 441.
60. Thus in the Teapot Dome scandal, Congress created a special prosecutor "with full
power and authority to carry on [criminal] proceedings," H.J. Res. 160, 43 Stat. 16 (1924),
and President Coolidge appointed such a prosecutor. See In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 40. In the
IRS scandal during the Truman Administration, a special counsel was appointed within the
Department of Justice. The failure to secure his independence from Executive Branch control
proved disastrous, since the Attorney General fired him when he sought papers from the Attorney General himself, and President Truman fired the Attorney General. See id. at 40-41. The
story of the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox in the famous "Saturday
Night Massacre" at the Justice Department and the subsequent appointment of Leon Jaworski
with full assurances of immunity from presidential interference, embodied in a formal regulation, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-95, is too well known to require extensive
repetition. Two independent counsels were appointed under the statute during the Carter Administration to investigate his White House Chief of Staff and his former campaign manager,
and the Attorney General appointed another official from outside the Department to investi-
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General has promulgated regulations under which independent counsels previously appointed under the statute may be-and have
been-reappointed to conduct precisely the same investigations with
precisely the same insulation from presidential removal as they had
under the Act."' It hardly seems likely that successive administrations would have acted in this manner if direct control by the President and the Attorney General of prosecutions of high government
officials were truly essential to the preservation of Executive Branch
prerogatives. On the contrary, Presidents and Attorneys General
have apparently perceived these investigations as political liabilities
and law enforcement nightmares and have willingly and repeatedly
shed this aspect of their law enforcement authority. The Act merely
regularizes a heretofore haphazard process and represents cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to achieve a mutually desired goal. It is a perfect example of "practice . . . in-

tegrat[ing] the dispersed powers into a workable government." 2
c. Any Impact on Executive Branch Prerogatives is Justified by
an Overriding Need to Promote an Objective Within the Constitutional Authority of Congress. - Assuming arguendo that the Act
creates some potential for disruption of the functioning of the Executive Branch, it nonetheless clearly passes the second prong of the
Nixon test.
Neither appellants nor the Department assert that it is beyond
the constitutional authority of the Congress to attempt to ensure that
the criminal laws will be applied to high government officials in a
fair and even-handed manner and in a way that will secure public
confidence in the integrity of the process. The constitutional crisis
which grew out of Watergate is a sufficient demonstration that without a mechanism to achieve this goal, there is grave question
whether we are in fact "a Nation capable of governing itself
63
effectively."1
The achievement of both the fact and the appearance of fairness
gate matters involving the President's brother. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 19, at
3541. And during the Reagan Administration at least seven independent counsels were appointed under the statute before the Department of Justice took the position that the Act is

unconstitutional.
61.

See 28 C.F.R. § 600 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 7270 (1987). See also In re Sealed Case,

829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(upholding authority of independent counsel appointed under
regulations), cert. denied 56 U.S.L.W. 3482 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-869).
62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
63.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 121.
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in the prosecutorial process is a sine qua non of effective law enforcement and hence of effective government in a free society. Thus despite the extremely broad discretion afforded prosecutors to choose
whether to go forward with a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment
requires the concurrence of a grand jury in all cases of "capital, or
otherwise infamous crime," and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments prevent prosecutors from proceeding
selectively,64 or on the basis of "an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," 65 or vindictively."6
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that a federal
prosecutor
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all ....As such, he is in a

peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
67
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.
Only last Term the Court held that the need for a disinterested prosecutor bars the appointment of a lawyer with a potential conflict of
interest to investigate and prosecute a criminal contempt of court.6 8
The Court deemed the point so fundamental that it declined to apply
harmless error analysis.6 9 Noting the "concern that prosecution by
an interested party may be influenced by improper motives,""0 the
Court concluded that any interest on the part of the prosecutor "creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general."171 The Court held:
"Public confidence in the disinterested conduct of [the prosecuting]
official is essential. Harmless error analysis is not equal to the task of
assuring that confidence."
The provisions of Title VI of the Ethics Act come into play only
where the status of the subject of the investigation as a high-level
member of the administration infuses the Attorney General and the
64.
65.
66.
711, 725
67.
68.
(1987).
69.
70.
71.
72.

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
(1969).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2135-41
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

2138-41.
2137.
2139.
2141.
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Department which he heads with precisely the sort of actual or potential conflict of interest which the Court held absolutely disqualifying in Young. The experience of the Watergate scandal and the allegations of criminal misconduct against members of the Carter and
Reagan administrations demonstrate graphically that public confidence in the administration of justice cannot be maintained where
the Attorney General is called upon to investigate close personal and
political associates of the President.73
The present case offers the paradigm of a conflict on the part of
the Attorney General and the Department, for the subject of the
investigation is a former high-level Justice Department official and
the investigation concerns allegations of improprieties pervading the
Department's conduct in a serious confrontation with the Legislative
Branch. Neither appellants nor the Department have suggested that
the fact and the appearance of fairness can be achieved in these circumstances by an investigation conducted or controlled by the
Department.
Thus neither the Act on its face nor its invocation in the circumstances of this case impermissibly invades the province of the
Executive Branch in light of the standards developed by the Supreme Court for judging separation of powers questions.
3. The Act's Restrictions on the Executive's Power of Removal
Do Not Violate the Separation of Powers Principle. - Finally, the
Ethics Act, by restricting the Attorney General to removal of an independent counsel for "good cause," 74 does no violence to the separation of powers doctrine. The Supreme Court has never struck down a
statute defining and limiting 'the circumstances in which the Executive Branch can remove an officer. To the contrary, it has upheld
essentially identical limitations on the executive's removal power
where they are justified by a functional need for independence from
Executive Branch control.1 5 The Court's only decisions invalidating
statutory removal provisions have involved aggrandizement of legislative power through direct congressional control of the removal of
an officer performing executive functions. 76 A brief review of the
73. This was, of course, precisely the conclusion which led Congress to act. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text.

74.

28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)(1982).

75.

Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (Federal Trade Com-

missioner removable only for cause); cf. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (War
Claims Commissioner not removable at President's pleasure).
76. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986) (invalidating exercise of final execu-

tive budgetary power by Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress); Myers v.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:65

Court's decisions in this area will demonstrate that the removal provisions of the Ethics Act pose no constitutional problem.
The Supreme Court's first major treatment of the separation of
powers implications of the removal authority was the Myers decision, upon which appellants place major reliance. In a lengthy opinion filled with strong assertions concerning executive prerogative,
Chief Justice (and, incidentally, former President) Taft held that
Congress could not constitutionally require Senate concurrence in
the removal of a postmaster."
The broad-ranging dicta of the Myers opinion did not long hold
sway as a definitive statement of constitutional theory. Nine years
later, in Humphrey's Executor,7 8 the Court upheld against Executive Branch attack statutory limitations upon the President's power
to remove commissioners of independent administrative agencies exercising law enforcement powers.7 9 The narrow holding of Myers
was undisturbed, but its dicta were disapproved and its scope severely limited.8 0
Humphrey's Executor was a milestone in the judicial acceptance of independent administrative agencies, through which Congress has chosen to accomplish much of its modern-day regulation of
commerce. The Court expressly recognized the intermixture in the
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (invalidating statute requiring Senate concurrence in removal of postmasters).
77. The Myers opinion developed and relied on the notion that the power of removal is
an incident of the power of appointment. See 272 U.S. at 119. This view would seem to permit
Congress to lodge the power to remove an independent counsel in the Division, bypassing the
Attorney General altogether. The Court need not face that question, however, since under the
Ethics Act the Attorney General has exclusive power to remove an independent counsel. Of
course, strict application of the notion that removal power is incident to appointment power
would lead to a different result in Myers itself, since Senate confirmation of postmasters was
required. See id. at 106.
78. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
79. The FTC Act prohibited presidential removal of a commissioner except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 295 U.S. at 620. This standard is essentially
indistinguishable from the "good cause" requirement of the Ethics Act.
80. The Court stated:
[T]he narrow point actually decided [in Myers] was only that the President had
power to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of
the Senate as required by act of Congress. In the course of the opinion of the court,
expressions occur which tend to sustain the government's contention, but these are
beyond the point involved and, therefore, do not come within the rule of stare decisis. In so far as they are out of harmony with the views here set forth, these expressions are disapproved.
295 U.S. at 626.
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agency's mandate of traditionally separate governmental functions,",

and the inclusion of law enforcement within its powers.8 2 It also paid
deference to Congress' determination that the agency's "duties are
performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control."8 3 It thus upheld the
insulation of the Commissioners from unfettered presidential removal, rejecting the argument that this invaded the power of the
Executive Branch. The Court stated that the scope of Congress' authority to limit the President's removal power "will depend upon the
character of the office." 84
The Court developed this theme further in the Wiener case,
where it rejected President Eisenhower's assertion of authority to remove a War Claims Commissioner from office. The statute creating
the Commission was silent on the subject of removal, and the Court
implied a limitation of presidential power from the nature and functions of the office itself.85 It said that the test for identifying those
officers who may be wholly or partly insulated from presidential
removal
81. 295 U.S. at 628.
82. Id. at 624. Thus the Court remarked that the Commission "is charged with the
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law." Id.
Appellants seek to avoid the impact of Humphrey's Executor by emphasizing the Court's
description of the FTC as an agency performing "quasi judicial" and "quasi legislative" functions. However, the language quoted above makes it clear that the Court recognized the obvious fact that the Commission was engaged in enforcing the law. As Justice White recently put
it:
[I]t is clear that the FTC's power to enforce and give content to the Federal Trade
Commission Act's proscription of "unfair" acts and practices and methods of competition is in fact "executive"

. .

.-

that is, it involves the implementation, (or the

interpretation and application) of an act of Congress. Thus, although the Court in
Humphrey's Executor found the use of the labels "quasi-legislative" and "quasijudicial" helpful in "distinguishing" its then-recent decision in Myers v. United
States, these terms are hardly of any use in limiting the holding of the case; as
Justice Jackson pointed out, "[t]he mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit
with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a
smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to
conceal a disordered bed."
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 628; see id at 624-26.
84. Id. at 631.
85. The Court was once again at pains to distance itself from the Myers dicta:
The assumption was short-lived that the Myers case recognized the President's
inherent constitutional power to remove officials, no matter what the relation of the
executive to the discharge of their duties and no matter what restrictions Congress
may have imposed regarding the nature of their tenure. The versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for definitiveness.
357 U.S. at 352.
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derives from the difference in functions between those who arepart
of the Executive establishment and those whose tasks require absolute freedom from executive interference . ... Thus, the most

reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding the President's
power of removal is the nature of the function that Congress invested in the [officer involved].86

Finally, the Court in 1986 invalidated portions of the GrammRudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act on the ground that it committed final decision-making authority with respect to spending cutbacks in certain circumstances to the Comptroller General, an official responsible to and removable by the Congress.87 The Court
reasoned that the final decision with respect to specific spending reductions was primarily an executive function, which Congress could
not vest in an official whom it retained exclusive power to remove. 88
The teaching of these cases is that Congress has the power to
create offices or agencies outside the "executive establishment" and
independent of Executive Branch control, and to vest those offices or
agencies with carefully circumscribed law enforcement powers where
this is necessary in its judgment to the fair and impartial implementation of valid legislative policy. What it may not do is to aggrandize
its own power by forcing an official exercising "executive" powers to
be responsive to its will through the reservation to itself of a role in
his removal.
It is quite plain, we submit, that the Ethics Act both meets the
test of Humphrey's Executor and Wiener for the creation of valid

limitations on the executive's power of removal and avoids the
prohibitions of Myers and Bowsher by lodging the removal power in
the Attorney General and reserving no role in the removal process
for Congress.89 Here Congress has, with ample justification, concluded that the public interest demands the creation of a law enforcement mechanism "free from executive control," 90 to deal with
the recurring problem of allegations of criminal misconduct against
86. 357 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
87. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
88. 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
89. Bowsher certainly does not stand for the proposition that the President possesses
unfettered power either to remove or to direct the performance of any officer exercising "executive" or "law enforcement" powers. The Solicitor General made precisely this argument in
Bowsher, but as Justice White correctly pointed out, the Court was careful not only to avoid
any such implication, but to reaffirm the vitality of Humphrey's Executor and Wiener. 106 S.
Ct. at 3206; see id. at 3188 n.4.
90. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
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high government officials and that that mechanism can function effectively only if certain limitations are placed upon the power of the
Executive Branch to remove the officer temporarily in charge of it.
The Constitution simply is not offended by the removal provisions of
the statute.
Finally, the Court has long held that Congress possesses broader
discretion to control the removal of officers who, like the independent
counsel, are "inferior Officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.9" We turn now to a consideration
of issues under the Appointments Clause.
B.

The Appointment of the Independent Counsel by a Court of
Law is Proper Under the Appointments Clause

Article II, section 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution, known as the
"Appointments Clause," provides in relevant part:
[The President] ...shall nominate, and by and with the Ad-

vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Appellants and the Department make two arguments why the
Act violates the Appointments Clause: (1) the independent counsel is
a "superior officer" who must be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate; and (2) Congress may not vest the appointment of a prosecuting official in a court of law. Neither argument
will withstand scrutiny.
1. The Independent Counsel Is an "Inferior Officer" Who Need
Not Be Appointed by the President and Confirmed by the Senate. There are two textual
reasons why an independent counsel is not a
' requiring
"superior officer" 92
presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation. First, the Appointments Clause specifies a rather narrow class of officers who are constitutionally required to be appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
91. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
92. The text of the Appointments Clause does not use the term "superior officer," but
instead distinguishes between "Officers of the United States" and "inferior Officers." The term

"superior officer" is used merely as a convenient shorthand to denote the former class of
officers.
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They are "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls [and]
Judges of the supreme Court.""3 An independent counsel is none of
these. Second, the second segment of the Clause expressly commits
to Congress the power to "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law or in the Heads of Departments. 9 4 The Clause, of course, permits presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of "all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law."95
But the "as they [Congress] shall think proper" language makes it
clear that it is for Congress to determine (with presidential concurrence, of course) whether a particular inferior officer should be subject to presidential nomination and Senate confirmation or to direct
appointment by the President, a court or the head of a department.
This reading of the text of the Appointments Clause comports
with the few judicial declarations in point. More than a century ago
the Supreme Court stated:
The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes. The primary class requires a
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But
foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided
that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned,
Congress might by law vest their appointment in the President
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.9 6
The textual reading is consistent with a functional analysis of
the offices involved. Thus in United States v. Solomon,97 the court
held that United States Attorneys are "inferior Officers" whose interim appointments can constitutionally be vested in the federal
courts. It follows a fortiori that independent counsels, whose
prosecutorial powers are strictly limited temporally and jurisdictionally, are "inferior Officers." The district court so held, as did the
Division, which remarked that "the Independent Counsel is clearly
an 'inferior officer'-he is appointed for a single task to serve for a
temporary limited period."98
93. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.(emphasis added).
Id.
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1878) (emphasis added).
216 F. Supp. 835, 840-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 44 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987).
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Indeed, the Attorney General has effectively conceded the "inferior Officer" issue by himself appointing, and offering to appoint,
independent counsels with powers absolutely identical to those
granted by the statute. As a "Head of Department" the Attorney
General may constitutionally appoint only "inferior Officers." In
fact, this Court last month sustained the power of the Attorney General to make such appointments on this ground in the face of an
identical argument that the powers of the independent counsel's office demanded presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. 9
Thus it is clear that the independent counsel is an "inferior Officer" properly appointed by an authority other than the President. 100
99. In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3482
(U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-869). The Court avoided deciding the question whether an independent counsel appointed under the statute is an "inferior officer," on the ground that the
Attorney General could rescind the regulation establishing the office created by him at any
time. Id. at 56-57. While the Court's avoidance of an unnecessary constitutional question was
plainly proper, the potential distinction proffered is, we submit, ultimately one without a difference. The determination whether an officer is an "inferior Officer" under art. II, § 2, cl. 2 must
be made with reference to the text of the Clause and the nature and powers of the office while
it is in existence. As this Court noted, the authority granted an independent counsel under the
regulations is "identical to that provided to an independent counsel by the Ethics Act," id. at
52, as are the provisions governing jurisdiction, removal, judicial review of removal, congressional oversight and relationship with the Department of Justice. It is inconceivable that the
identical office is an "inferior" one when its occupant is appointed by the Attorney General
and a "superior" one when its occupant is appointed by a "Court of Law," which is after all
another of the subordinate appointing authorities listed in the second segment of the Clause.
In a similar vein, the argument that an independent counsel cannot be an "inferior" officer because he has no immediate "superior," Department of Justice Brief, supra note 15, at
13-15, is little more than a play on words. It finds no support in the decisions construing the
Clause. To the contrary, the federal election commissioners whose appointments as "inferior
officers" were upheld in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880), had no statutory
"superiors." See id. at 379-80. And the very legislative history cited by the Department, Department of Justice Brief, supra note 15, at 13-14, refutes its simplistic argument: each "Head
of Department" within the Executive Branch is "inferior" in the "hierarchical sense" to the
President and serves at his pleasure, but the First Congress concluded, according to the Department, that they were not "inferior officers" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Thus
simple "subordinancy" is not and never has been the test. In any event, an independent counsel
has a "superior" in the constitutionally significant sense, see Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at
3188, for the Attorney General is granted the exclusive power of removal. See 28 U.S.C. §
596(a)(1)(1982). See supra p. 83-87 where we deal with the argument that limitations on the
Attorney General's power of removal transgress the separation of powers, but the fact remains
that it is the Attorney General who can remove an independent counsel.
100. It is equally clear that staff appointed by an independent counsel to assist in the
performance of his or her duties are "employees" and not "officers" who must be appointed in
conformity with the Appointments Clause. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1878), that not all persons employed by the federal government must be deemed "officers" appointed under art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Court held that the
term "officer" "embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and that the
latter were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary." Id. Thus it concluded
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2. A "Court of Law" May Constitutionally Appoint a Temporary Prosecuting Official. - The plain language of the Appointments Clause gives to Congress the power to "vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Nothing in
this language purports to limit Congress' choice of a particular appointing authority for any specific "inferior Officer." And the Supreme Court more than a century ago gave this language its natural
construction, squarely rejecting the argument put forward here by
appellants and the Department:
[A]s the Constitution stands, the selection of the appointingpower,
as between the functionaries named, is a matter resting in the discretion of Congress. And, looking at the subject in a practical light,
it is perhaps better that it should rest there, than that the country
should be harassed by the endless controversies to which a more
specific direction on this subject might have given rise.'"1

The argument that appointments may constitutionally be made
only by the branch of government in which the office is located finds
that a civil surgeon appointed by the Commissioner on Pensions was an "employee," not an
"officer" subject to the requirements of the Appointments Clause. And in Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890), the Court held that a merchant appraiser was an employee who
need not be appointed in conformity with the Clause. It noted that the appraiser had no "employment which has any duration as to time, or which extends over any case further than as he
is selected to act in that particular case." Id. at 327. In Buckley v. Valeo the Court, relying on
Germaine and Auffmordt, distinguished between "officers" who exercise "significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States," 424 U.S. at 126, and "employees", who are "lesser
functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States." Id. n.162. It noted that the federal
election commissioners in that case were "appointed for a statutory term, [and] are not subject
to the control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative authority." Id.
The Ethics Act vests all the powers and duties of the office directly in the independent
counsel. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1)(1982). Among the powers granted to the independent
counsel is "to appoint, fix the compensation, and assign the duties, of such employees as such
independent counsel deems necessary .

. . ."

28 U.S.C. § 594(c)(1982) (emphasis added). In

context, the choice of the word "employees" was hardly fortuitous, but embodied a congressional judgment about the status of the staff of independent counsels. The text of the Appointments Clause makes clear that the judgment of Congress in this area is entitled to great
weight. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98. Moreover, there is no record support
whatever for the assertion that deputy independent counsel are "the equivalent of Assistant
U.S. Attorneys." Appellant Brief I, supranote 15, at 32. This Court, we submit, should not fly
in the face of a considered congressional judgment in the absence of clear contrary evidence.
The proffered analogy to Assistant United States Attorneys is in any event highly attenuated
on its face. Assistant United States Attorneys are appointed for indefinite terms and have
general charge of numerous investigations. By statute, independent counsel's staff can have no
tenure or authority beyond the single investigation for which their boss was appointed and
cannot exercise the powers which are committed to the independent counsel alone.
101. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397-98 (emphasis added).
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its sole support in an oblique 148-year-old dictum in Ex parte Hennen,1 0 2 where the Court remarked, in approving judicial appointment
and removal of a court clerk, that "[t]he appointing power here designated... [by the Appointments Clause] was no doubt intended to
be exercised by the department of the government to which the officer to be appointed most appropriately belonged. 10 3
The force of the Hennen dictum was roundly put to rest in Siebold, where the Court stated that it "was not intended to define the
constitutional power of Congress in this regard, but rather to express
the law or rule by which it should be governed."104 The Siebold
Court upheld the appointment of officials exercising purely "executive" powers-federal election supervisors-by the federal courts. 1°5
Appellants and the Department seize upon a phrase at the end
of the Siebold opinion in an effort to resurrect a slightly diminished
version of the Hennen dictum.10 6 Distinguishing cases where, without
express constitutional authorization, Congress had sought unsuccessfully to impose nonjudicial duties upon courts, the Court stated:
"But the duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by
law, is a constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case
there is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the
courts from its performance, or to render their acts void. 107 Appellants would find "incongruity" in the appointment by a court of an
official exercising "executive" or "law enforcement" functions. But
such a reading would make the exception swallow the rule. The election supervisors in Siebold were plainly executive officers whose role
in criminal law enforcement gave rise to the challenge which the
Court rejected.
Appellants have not pointed to a single case where congressional
vesting of the appointment power has been struck down as "incongruous." The few cases in point reject appellants' argument. Thus in
102.

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839).

103.
104.

Id.
100 U.S. at 398.

105. The ruling in Siebold appears to conform, not merely to the plain language of the
Clause, but to the understanding of its meaning by the members of the Senate Judiciary Com-

mittee of the First Congress, many of them former members of the Constitutional Convention,
who reported out a bill lodging the power to appoint United States Attorneys in the federal

courts. See Brief of The Speaker & Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House as Amicus
Curiae at 24-28, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).

106.

Appellant Brief, supra note 15, at 30-31; Department of Justice Brief, supra note

15, at 34-35.

107.

100 U.S. at 398.
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United States v. Solomon,108 the court, relying on Siebold, found no
violation of separation of powers in the appointment of United States
Attorneys on an interim basis by the courts.10 9 And last Term the
Supreme Court upheld the power of federal courts to appoint prosecutors in criminal contempt cases. 110
There is simply no impediment in the Appointments Clause to
the appointment of independent counsels by a "Court of Law."
C.

The Powers Granted to the Division by the Statute do not
Contravene the Limitations of Article III

The powers of the Division under the statute do no violence to
the limitations of Article III, both because those powers are
grounded, not in Article III alone but in the Appointments Clause as
well, and because those powers are not in and of themselves inconsistent with Article III.
1. The Division's Powers Under the Statute Derive From the
Appointments Clause, as Well as Article III. - We may agree with
appellants that Congress may not, as a general matter, vest courts
sitting under Article III with "executive or administrative duties of a
nonjudicial nature." ' The Division operates under the Act, how108. 216 F. Supp. 835, 838-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
109. See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 913-15 (D.D.C. 1967) (3 judge court
upholding appointment of D.C. School Board members by federal court and rejecting "incongruity" argument). See also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 &
n.2 (1931) (United States Commissioners, who exercised prosecutorial powers, are "inferior
officers" appointed by courts).
110. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. at 2124, 2130-34
(1987). While no issue under the Appointments Clause was involved in Young, see 107 S. Ct.
at 2142 & n.l (Scalia, J., concurring), the argument put forward by petitioners and rejected
by the Court was essentially the same "incongruity" argument put forward here: that courts
cannot appoint prosecutors in cases of contempt committed outside the presence of the court,
because such "contempts, which require prosecution by a party other than the court, are essentially conventional crimes, prosecution of which may be initiated only by the executive
branch." Id. at 2132. If a court may take the first step to initiate the prosecution of an out-ofcourt contempt without violating the separation of powers, it necessarily follows that there is
no inherent "incongruity" in a court exercising powers vested in it by Congress to appoint a
temporary prosecuting officer.
We note a certain irony in the fact that the Solicitor General in Young filed a Brief
Amicus Curiae supporting the power of the courts to appoint private lawyers to prosecute
criminal cases in the name of the United States where there is "substantial justification" and it
is done "in conformity with principles of fairness, sound judicial administration and the disinterested exercise of federal prosecutorial responsibility." Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae, Young. Even more, the Solicitor General pointed to Title VI of the Ethics Act as an
example of an appropriate "departure from the exclusive authority of the Attorney General to
prosecute federal crimes." Id. at 19 n.14.
1I1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 123; see, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
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ever, not exclusively as an Article III court, but also as an appointing authority vested with powers by Congress under the Appointments Clause. It follows that the exercise of powers incident to
the specific grant of authority to Congress in the Appointments
Clause takes precedence over the more general limitations inherent
in the provisions of Article III and the concept of separation of powers. It was argued in United States v. Solomon 122 that the statutory
power of district court judges to appoint an interim United States
Attorney was inconsistent with the limitations on the judicial function under Article III and the separation of powers. The court rejected this argument, stating that "application ...[of the doctrine of

separation of powers] must be subordinated to the particular provisions of [the Constitution] in this instance as to methods of
appointment." 13
This authority derived from the Appointments Clause sustains,
not merely the bare power of appointment, but also the Division's
power under section 593(b) to define the jurisdiction of an independent counsel. The latter power is plainly a necessary incident, under
the statutory scheme, of the power to appoint. In creating a law enforcement mechanism largely independent of Executive Branch control, to be invoked in those narrow circumstances where the Department of Justice is disabled to proceed, Congress sought to intrude as
little as possible into the executive's law enforcement functions. To
achieve this end, it was necessary to confine the authority of an independent counsel, a task which in the nature of things could only be
performed on a case-by-case basis. Evidently deeming the performance of this fact-intensive task a proper incident of the appointment
power, Congress vested it in the Division, rather than the Attorney
General, whose actual or potential conflict of interest could obviously
play itself out quite powerfully in the definition of an independent
counsel's jurisdiction. 1 4
How.) 40 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
112.

216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

113. Id. at 840-41.
114. This obvious potential for a conflict of interest on the part of the Attorney General

in defining an independent counsel's jurisdiction renders lame the argument that the Division's
power to perform this function undermines the constitutionality of the statute. Lodging this

power in the Division obviously serves the vital law enforcement imperative of securing the
fact and the appearance of disinterest on the part of prosecuting officials. See Young v. United

States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. at 2135-41.
This case in any event presents no issue concerning the power of the Division under either
the statute or the Constitution to grant an independent counsel substantially broader jurisdiction than that contended for by the Attorney General. The Division here was entirely faithful
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It has been held in a somewhat different context that the power
of a federal court to engage in activities arguably beyond the normal
judicial sphere may derive from or at least be augmented by authority vested pursuant to the Appointments Clause. In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.," 5 the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Federal Magistrate's Act, 16 and the authority vested in the courts by the Act to delegate certain judicial tasks
to magistrates, on the ground that the power derived from the Appointments Clause augmented the judicial power derived from Article III:
This constitutional authority for the exercise of the appointment
power by Article III judges implies an important dimension to the
judicial power: the judiciary is permitted a degree of control and
discretion for the design and shape of its own system. The Magistrates Act implements this constitutional authority.117
It is thus clear that the strictures of Article III do not apply to a
court of law exercising the power to appoint under Article II, section
2, cl. 2, and that such a body may properly exercise all powers necessarily incident to the power to appoint."'
2. The Division's Powers Under the Statute Do Not Violate Article III. - Even assuming that the Division comes to its tasks under
the Act encumbered by Article III's limitations on the judicial
power, those limitations are not inconsistent with its exercise of the
power to define the jurisdiction of an independent counsel.
Federal courts sitting under Article III exercise extensive supervisory powers over the conduct of criminal proceedings, frequently
on the basis of ex parte applications by prosecuting authorities,"'
to the Attorney General's suggestion with respect to jurisdiction. See Brief for Appellee, supra
note 15. Moreover, it declined the request of the independent counsel for expanded jurisdiction, on the ground that the Attorney General had previously determined not to seek the appointment of an independent counsel with respect to the allegations involved and that his determination was binding under the Act. In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 47.
115. 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
116. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1982).
117. 725 F.2d at 545.
118. Also relevant to the analysis at this point is the Necessary and Proper Clause, art.
I, § 8, cl. 18. While this clause is not an independent source of congressional power, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 135-36, "[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress,
the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine." Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). The Division considered that the Necessary and Proper Clause supported Congress' choice of means in the Ethics Act. In re Olson, 818 F.2d at 44.
119. Appellants complain that art. III is violated because much of the Division's business is conducted in camera pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(d)(2), 593(b)(1982). Appellant
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and have done since the beginnings of the Republic. The Fourth
Amendment expressly contemplates that neutral, detached magistrates exercising judicial power will pass upon the ex parte applications of prosecutorial officers for search and arrest warrants, and
judges of Article III courts are fully empowered in this context to
tell the representatives of the Executive Branch whether the evidence
presented justifies the prosecutorial actions they seek to carry out.12
Yet another important function of Article III courts during the
investigative stages of the law enforcement process is the supervision
and direction of the grand jury and of the conduct of executive officers before the grand jury. The court may, among other things,
decide challenges to the array, 121 rule upon motions to quash or limit
subpoenas and grant or deny ex parte applications for immunization
of witnesses. 22 In the early days of the Republic, the court's power
to charge the grand jury represented an especially potent means of
controlling the course of law enforcement.123 The courts still posses
broad powers to supervise the activities of grand juries, and one who
is tempted to view this power as a mere vestige of a different era
should recall the very substantial influence exercised by Chief Judge
Sirica throughout the deliberations of the Watergate grand jury.
These and other functions traditionally exercised by courts sitting under Article III do not differ qualitatively from the power to
define the jurisdiction of an independent counsel. Appellants make
no effort to distinguish these everyday judicial activities defining and
limiting the executive's law enforcement powers. Instead, they rely
upon cases such as United States v. Cox,1 24 which denied to courts
the power to compel prosecutors to proceed upon indictments by
Brief I, supra note 15, at 44-45. Judicial proceedings, it is argued, are traditionally open. Yet

many of the traditional supervisory functions of courts alluded to in the text are performed in
camera.
120. See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1982) (applications to court for approval
of electronic surveillance).

121.

FED.

122.
123.

18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982).
For his highly partisan exercise of that power under the Alien and Sedition laws,

R.

CRIM. P.

6(b).

Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court was impeached by the House of Representatives
in the first Congress of the Jefferson Administration. The Senate refused to convict Justice

Chase, apparently on the view that the importation of partisan quarrels over the manner in
which judicial power was exercised threatened judicial independence. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 273-82, 289-97 (rev. ed. 1926). Implicit in this
judgment was the proposition that Article III countenanced this form of vigorous judicial con-

trol of the law enforcement process.

124.

342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
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means of the contempt power.1 25 These cases are inapposite. The Division appoints independent counsels, not pursuant to any asserted
judicial power to override executive decisions, but pursuant to statutory authority and only on the application of the Attorney General.
And the statute does not purport to give the Division power to compel an independent counsel to prosecute a criminal case. All decisions respecting criminal law enforcement within the independent
counsel's jurisdiction are committed by the Act to the independent
counsel. 28
Nor may appellants take comfort from the fact that many of
the judicial activities referred to above involve the imposition of limits upon the exercise of prosecutorial powers, as opposed to affirmative involvement in the initiation of the criminal process. Federal
judges have traditionally referred evidence of potential criminal misconduct coming to their attention to the Department of Justice for
consideration of criminal prosecution, and they are even authorized
to make arrests "[flor any offense against the United States."'1 7
More important, the courts possess broad powers to initiate
prosecutions for contempt of court, including the power to refer such
matters to the United States Attorney or to appoint private counsel
to prosecute the matter where appropriate.128 This power was upheld
by the Supreme Court last Term in Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A..1 29 That decision is, we submit, dispositive of
appellants' argument. Certainly the justification for the exercise of
the power to appoint a prosecutor outside the Executive Branch in
Young-the vindication of judicial authority-differs from the justification for its exercise under the Ethics Act. But Young stands incontrovertibly for the proposition that there is nothing inherently
nonjudicial about the exercise of such power by a court.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully prayed that the judgments below be affirmed.
125. Id. See also United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 971 (1976) (holding that a federal court has no inherent power to appoint a special
prosecutor to carry on a criminal case the Executive Branch has declined to prosecute).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a), (g)(1982).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1982).
128. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
129. 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987).
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IN RE SEALED CASE -BRIEF ON BEHALF OF
AMICUS CURIAE UNITED STATES**
I. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
This appeal raises complex and difficult constitutional issues of
the most fundamental and enduring importance to the government of
the United States. While our professional and governmental responsibilities compel us to advise the Court of the Executive's views on
the constitutional issues presented, these views are advanced with
some reluctance - a reluctance born of our appreciation and endorsement of the policy objectives served by the Independent Counsel statute' and our profound sense of obligation to defend enactments of the Legislative Branch. For these reasons, we have sought
to further the policy goals reflected in the statute in every manner
that could be reconciled with our oft-expressed views concerning separation of powers principles.
In the decade since the Independent Counsel statute was enacted, the Executive Branch has consistently and faithfully complied
with all of its requirements, despite our well-known misgivings about
the constitutionality of certain of its provisions. We have also taken
extraordinary measures to protect against constitutional challenge
the work of the more recently appointed Independent Counsel - including the Independent Counsel at issue in this litigation - by offering each of them appointments in the Department of Justice.'
Two Independent Counsel have accepted these parallel appointments, under which they enjoy the full authority conferred by their
court appointments. The validity of these parallel appointments and
their ability to protect ongoing investigations against constitutional
challenge has recently been upheld by this Court.3 We regret that
the Independent Counsel involved in this litigation chose not to accept our offer, which was renewed on August 31, 1987 and, of
course, remains open.
We have also gone to great lengths to offer a saving construc** This brief was filed in In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The only
changes made were those necessary to conform the brief to Law Review style.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982).
2. See 52 Fed. Reg. 7270 (1987)(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 600).
3. See In re: Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3482
(U.S. Jan. 19, 1988)(No. 87-869).
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tion of the statute where we thought it possible to do so. In one case,
we argued strenuously for a narrow interpretation of certain statutory provisions involving the Court's power to expand the jurisdiction
of the Independent Counsel. The Special Division of the Court accepted our proffered construction of the provisions in question, noting the serious constitutional issues that would otherwise have
arisen.4 Regrettably, this case in its present posture offers no such
opportunity, for the challenge before this Court appears to ripe and
encompasses the statutory scheme in its entirety.
Moreover, during the years leading up to the enactment of the
Ethics in Government Act5 (hereafter "the Ethics Act"), and thereafter, successive Administrations have repeatedly expressed their
profound constitutional concerns to Congress. Attorneys General
over different administrations since the passage of the original Ethics
Act in 1977 have stated that the Independent Counsel provisions of
this law transgress the separation of powers limitations embodied in
the Constitution.6 In 1981, then-Attorney General Smith informed
the Senate Legal Counsel, as had prior Attorneys General, of our
"serious reservations" respecting the constitutionality of the statute,
and stated quite plainly that "[i]f the Department's position is
sought in future litigation, we would espouse views consistent with"
those reservations. 7 The Department reiterated its profound doubts
about the constitutionality of the statute during the reauthorization
hearings in 1981, 1982, and again this year. We have repeatedly
suggested statutory alternatives that fully address the concerns of
public integrity that underlie this statute without sacrificing the
Constitution's most fundamental structural imperative - the separation of powers. 8
4.

See In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

5. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)(codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (1982)).
6. See, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 14476 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 23, 1976)(testimony of Attorney General
Levi); Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 22, 1981)(testimony of Associate Attorney General
Giuliani). During hearings last spring on reauthorization of the Independent Counsel statute,
former Attorney General Griffin Bell acknowledged that he had supported enactment of the
Independent Counsel statute in 1977 notwithstanding his "considerable doubt" about its constitutionality, and urged that the law now be allowed to expire. Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess
(June 3, 1987)(testimony of Griffin Bell).
7. Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Michael Davidson, Senate
Legal Counsel (April 17, 1981).
8.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1982 US.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/5

CODE

34

et al.: The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act: Morr
ETHICS ACT

1987]

We have undertaken these efforts because we recognize that ensuring public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of criminal
law investigations of high Executive Branch officials is a most important goal. Indeed, we can appreciate Congress' view that divesting
the President of his constitutionally-established authority to conduct
such investigations is the simplest and most convenient method of
attaining this end. But our sympathy for the goal reflected in the
Ethics Act can neither influence our legal analysis nor blind us to
the enduring harm it visits on constitutional values; "[t]he tendency
is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies

. . .

and lose

sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of
our Republic." 9"The choices we discern as having been made in the
Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but.
. . we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by

making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." 10 It is to preserve this ultimate safeguard against majoritarian tyranny - the other checks
and balances of our tripartite system of government - that we file
this brief."
II.

STATEMENT

The Ethics Act12 states that the Attorney General shall conduct
an investigation if he receives sufficient evidence of wrongdoing by
specified high-level Executive Branch and presidential election campaign officials.13 If the Attorney General determines within 90 days
that further investigation or prosecution is warranted (or if no determination is made in that time), he shall apply to a Special Division
of this Court14 to appoint an Independent Counsel to take over the
matter.15 This Court must then appoint an "appropriate" counsel
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3553.

9.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181, 3193-94 (1986).
11. Authority to file this brief is provided by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29

and 28 U.S.C.
12.

§ 597(b)(1982). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1982).

28 U.S.C.

§9

591-97 (1982).

13. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1982). The relevant portions of the Constitution and the Ethics
Act are reprinted in an addendum to this brief.
14. Described in 28 U.S.C.

15. 28 U.S.C.

§

49 (1982).

§ 592 (1982).
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and define his jurisdiction."6
Upon appointment, an Independent Counsel essentially assumes
exclusively the powers of the Attorney General in investigating and
prosecuting the matter. 17 An Independent Counsel may appoint his
own staff to assist him as he deems necessary, or he may use existing
Department of Justice personnel. 18 "[E]xcept where not possible,"
an Independent Counsel shall "comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 19
An Independent Counsel may be removed by the Attorney General, other than by impeachment, only for "good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially
impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties."20 An
Independent Counsel may challenge his removal in a civil action
before the Special Division, which may order "reinstatement or other
appropriate relief" if removal was based on "error of law or fact."21
Before terminating his office, an Independent Counsel must report to the Special Division, detailing his work and the reasons for
not prosecuting any matter within his authority.22 In addition, the
Special Division may sua sponte terminate an Independent Counsel's
office upon determining that any investigations or prosecutions
within his jurisdiction have been completed "or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete such investigations and prosecutions."2 3
In this matter, an Independent Counsel was appointed and is
currently conducting an investigation. The constitutionality of the
Ethics Act has been challenged. On July 20, 1987, the district court
upheld the validity of the statute.24 The constitutional issue is now
properly raised in this Court. 5
16.

28 U.S.C. § 593 (1982).

17.

28 U.S.C. §§ 594(a), 597(a) (1982).

18.

28 U.S.C. § 594(c)-(d) (1982).

19.

28 U.S.C. § 594(0 (1982).

20.

28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982).

21.

28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (1982).

22.

28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(1)-(2) (1982).

23.

28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1982).

24.

In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987).

25. See In re Sealed Case, 827 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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III.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Two key constitutional doctrines - separation of powers and
the unitary Executive - govern the issues posed here.
A.

The Separation of Powers

The Constitution divides the powers of the Federal Government
among the three Branches as part of a system of checks and balances. In order to avoid the danger of a single part of the Federal
Government both passing and executing tyrannical laws, the Framers intended the separation of powers to ensure, as nearly as possible,
that each Branch would operate only within its assigned sphere of
responsibility. 26 "The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed
the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. ''2 7 Thus, the Constitution was informed by Montesquieu's the-

ory of distinct and separate departments of government, qualified by
express departures from that theory where deemed necessary by the
Framers as a self-executing safeguard against possible abuse by one
of those departments.2
B.

The Unitary Executive

Although the Framers wanted to disperse the powers of the new
Federal Government among three Branches, they also united the
power to administer the laws in a single Executive: "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.

'29

This statement, giving executive power to the President,

does more than "merely nam[e] the department;" rather, it is a
grant of power.3 0

The vesting of the "executive Power" in the President and his
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 31 give substance to the Framers' agreement that there must be a unitary, vigorous, and independent Executive responsible directly to the peo26. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983).

27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
28. Id. at 120, 122; THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 47 at 302-03 (J.Madison) (C.
Rossiter
ed. 1961); F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 258-60 (1985).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
30. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926).
31. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
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ple. 32 Unity in the execution of the laws was deemed by the Framers
to be "a leading character in the definition of good government. 33
In Alexander Hamilton's view, "[ihis unity may be destroyed ...
by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the
control and cooperation of others. 3 4 The Framers thus considered
and rejected several plans which would have diffused executive
responsibility.3 5
An absence of unity in the Executive would, in the eyes of
the Framers, create a lack of responsibility and accountability. 6 As
this Court has explained, "[ihe executive power under our Constitution. . . is not shared - it rests exclusively with the President....
[T]he founders chose to risk the potential for tyranny inherent in
gain the advantages of acplacing power in one person, in order 3to
7
countability fixed on a single source."
C.

The Ethics Act Violates the Appointments Clause

The Appointments Clause 8 is one of the primary mechanisms
in the Constitution implementing the doctrines of separation of powers and the unitary Executive. The Ethics Act violates the clause in
two separate ways.
1. The Ethics Act violates the Appointments Clause insofar as it
authorizes court appointment of an Officer who, because of the powers given him, must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The powers given the Independent Counsel under the Ethics Act, as interpreted in its legislative history,
32. C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, 70-75, 119-23, 140-60
(1969).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-24 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The importance to the Framers of a single Executive may have sprung from the disorganization that
plagued the Continental Congress' efforts to direct the American Revolution. See Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 41, 68-69; THACH, supra note 32, at

57-68; Id. at 62 (Confederation experience prompted demands for "unitary departmental control and integration" in executing laws).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424.
35. The first plan was Edmund Randolph's proposal that the Executive consist of three
members drawn from separate geographical regions. See 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 66, 71-74, 88, 91-92, 97 (rev. ed. 1966). The Convention

also turned down a proposal for the President to have a Privy Council, consisting either of the
Chief Justice and the heads of the executive departments, 2 M. FARRAND, supra, at 335-37, or
representative of regions. Id. at 533, 542.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 428-29. See generally 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at
65-67, 71-74, 96-97, 109, 254, 266-67.
37. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

2.
38. U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl.
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make inescapable the conclusion that Congress intended the Independent Counsel to be subordinate to no one. An Independent Counsel, who himself appoints Inferior Officers, reigns supreme within his
assigned area.
2. Even if the Independent Counsel is deemed to be a proper
Inferior Officer, he must be appointed by the Executive Branch because he performs an indisputably executive function. Otherwise, the
separation of powers is substantially undermined and the Framers'
crucial goal of accountability is defeated because the voters cannot
hold the Executive Branch responsible if the Judicial Branch made
the appointments.
Criminal prosecution is a function indisputably assigned by the
Constitution to the Executive Branch. 39 Enforcement of the criminal
laws requires a vast amount of discretion because the prosecutor
must determine whether a particular prosecution represents the best
allocation of government resources and the likelihood of obtaining
favorable and useful results, as well as fairness to the accused. The
prosecutor must often weigh policy concerns -in other crucial areas
such as foreign relations and national security before embarking on a
public prosecution.
The argument has been made that the Appointments Clause
should nevertheless be given a new meaning because Congress must
be able to provide for selection of Independent Counsels outside the
Executive Branch so that high level officials in that Branch can successfully be investigated and prosecuted. This contention is unavailing because the Framers provided in the Constitution the means to
monitor the performance of the Executive Branch in carrying out the
laws, and history has demonstrated that the Executive Branch can
effectively investigate itself.
D. The Ethics Act Assigns Non-Judicial Functions to a Court in
Violation of Article III
The Framers provided that the courts will decide only "cases or
controversies, ' ' 40 thereby safeguarding the independence of the Judicial Branch, and assuring public confidence in the disinterestedness
of the judiciary. In violation of these principles, the Act assigns
judges the non-judicial functions of determining the scope of an Independent Counsel's authority, and of deciding when the office of an
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1.
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Independent Counsel should be terminated because its assigned task
is thought to have been completed."1 Neither of these decisions is to
be made within the context of a specific case or controversy.
E. The Ethics Act Violates Article II Because Criminal Law
Enforcement Must be Subject to the Supervision of the Executive
The Ethics Act also contravenes the Constitution by eliminating
or strictly limiting the power of the Executive Branch to appoint,
control, and remove an Officer charged with the quintessential executive duty of criminal law enforcement. 2 Such a key Officer must
serve under the direct supervision of the Executive. If the doctrines
of separation of powers and the unitary Executive are to have meaning, Officers charged with these law enforcement responsibilities
must function within the Executive Branch.

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The Ethics Act is Invalid Because it Providesfor
Appointment of an Independent Counsel in a Manner Inconsistent
With the Appointments Clause of the Constitution
The Supreme Court made clear in Buckley,43 that any official
exercising "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" is an "Officer of the United States" and must, therefore, be
appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.44 That clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts
45
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

An Independent Counsel who exercises the substantial power of the
Attorney General of the United States is obviously an "Officer of the
United States" covered by the Appointments Clause.
41. See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
43. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
44. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
45. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/5

40

et al.: The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act: Morr
1987]

ETHICS ACT

The Ethics Act violates the Appointments Clause in two ways.
First, an Officer who exercises executive power such as that invested
in the Independent Counsel can be appointed only by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Second, even if an Independent Counsel is properly classified as an Inferior Officer, he cannot be appointed by this Court since the duties he fulfills are purely
executive in nature.
1. The Powers Conferred on an Independent Counsel by the
Ethics Act Require That he be Appointed by the President with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate.
a. The Constitution establishes two distinct procedures of the
appointment of "Officers of the United States." The first procedure
is appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. This is the procedure that must be followed for certain
named officers - Ambassadors, Consuls, and Supreme Court justices - and also for all other Officers of the United States unless
they fall within the exception established for "inferior" Officers.
For Inferior Officers, Congress may, in its discretion, vest appointment authority in the President alone, the courts of law, or the
Heads of Departments, thus avoiding the requirement of advice and
consent by the Senate. 46 The Appointments Clause acts as a limitation upon the ability of Congress to dispense with the Senate's role
in the appointment process; only Inferior Officers may be so
appointed.
b. There is virtual unanimity among the courts and commentators, and in the congressional debates from the First Congress, that
the term "inferior" is used in the Constitution in its hierarchical
sense. That is, an Officer who is subordinate to another is, in that
respect, inferior to that Officer. Accordingly, Executive Branch Officers may be Inferior Officers only if they are subordinate to another
who controls, supervises, or oversees their performance.
The debate in the First Congress, when "the founders of our
Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs," adopts this hierarchical construction of "in46. The phrase "Head of Departments" is used in the Inferior Officer exception to the
Appointments Clause. The phrase "principal Officer in each of the executive Departments"

appears in the preceding clause which states that the President may require the written opinion of such persons, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, and in Amendment XXV, § 4, dealing with
presidential disability. We understand these phrases to mean the same thing. See United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1978).
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ferior" and "fixes the construction to be given its provisions."'4 7
In the great debate concerning the establishment of the original
Department of Foreign Affairs, the First Congress extensively discussed the construction of Article II's appointment power. Some congressman argued that a Department Head is an Inferior Officer because he is subordinate to the President in the exercise of his
duties.48
This view was rejected. Rather, the First Congress concluded
that Heads of Departments are principal or superior officers, and
those subordinate to these officials are "inferior. 49
All points of view in this early congressional debate were premised on the notion of subordination as defining Inferior Officers.
The contention that Department Heads are Inferior Officers turned
upon their subordinate relation to the President; the rejection of this
view turned upon the recognition in the text of the Constitution of
the "superior" status of the Department Heads (as "principal" officers) and, hence, Inferior Officers were regarded as those
subordinate to them. No member of that First Congress argued that
a classification as inferior or superior turns upon the relative impor50
tance of the office at issue.
The Supreme Court's opinions are consistent with this construction. 51 And, as the court held in Collins v. United States:52
[T]he word inferior is not here used in that vague, indefinite, and
quite inaccurate sense which has been suggested - the sense of
petty or unimportant; but it means subordinate or inferior to those
officers in whom respectively the power of appointment may be
47. Myers, 272 U.S. at 175. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3187; Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (substantial weight should be accorded to constitutional interpretations

by early sessions of Congress).
48.

See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 492 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of Representa-

tive Clymer).
49. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 455-56 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of Representative White); id. at 509 (statement of Representative Benson); id. at 518 (statement of Representative White); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 386 n.1 (3d ed. 1858)

("Whether the heads of departments are inferior officers, in the sense of the constitution, was
much discussed .... The result of the debate seems to have been, that they were not.").

50. This view has largely been accepted by scholars and commentators. See, e.g., E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 76 (1957)("What officers are 'inferior' in the
sense of the constitutional provision? ...The term seems to suggest in this particular context
officers intended to be subordinate to those in whom their appointment is vested, and at the
same time to exclude the courts of law and heads of departments.").
51. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839); Germaine, 99
U.S. at 509-11.

52.

14 Ct. Cl. 568, 574 (1879).
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vested - the President, the courts of law, and the heads of
departments.5"
Defining an Inferior Officer by reason of his subordinate status,
rather than the importance of his duties, has also been the practice
of the Attorney General for many years. 4
In the context of this case, the subordinancy that identifies an
Inferior Officer is demonstrated only if the relevant official's actions
are subject to the direction and control, on pain of removal, of another official.5 5 Accordingly, only if the relevant provisions of the Act
are construed to subject an Independent Counsel, in the full range of
his activities, to the direction and control of the Attorney General
can he be said to be an inferior officer in the constitutional sense. In
light of the Act's language, legislative history and purposes, however,
we are constrained to the view that the Act cannot reasonably be so
5 a
interpreted.
c. The very arguments offered in support of the validity of the
Independent Counsel establish that such an Officer is not
subordinate for Appointment Clause purposes. The Ethics Act is
premised on the theory that an Independent Counsel is a necessity
because only an Officer free from direction and control of the President or the Attorney General can perform an investigation and prosecution of high Executive Branch officials.5 Thus, the Ethics Act
specifically contemplates that the Independent Counsel will not
subordinate to any Officers in that Branch; and, any decisions made
by the Independent Counsel are final insofar as the Executive
Branch is involved.
53. Id. at 574.
54. In 1901, the Attorney General explained that he did not think that the term Inferior
Officer "while importing a difference in relative rank, necessarily conveys the idea of unimportant or petty officers. It means subordinate officers in a general way, and indicates those who
are different from as well as lower in rank than the officers specified." 23 Opin. Atty. Gen.
574, 577-78 (1902).
55. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 135.
56. This reading of the Appointments Clause preserves the congressional discretion that
was apparently meant to be part of the clause. See I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 557 (J, Gales ed.
1789) (June 19, 1789 statement of Representative Baldwin) ("[w]e may find it necessary that
subordinate officers should be appointed in the first instance by the President [with the advice
and consent of the] Senate"). Congress still can determine that, despite the fact that a particular office is an inferior one, it is important enough so that presidential appointment and senatorial approval are needed.
57. See S. REP.No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 54, 67, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4216, 4221-23, 4270, 4283; H.R. REP.No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1978); In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56, 61-62 (D.D.C. Cir. 1987).
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The legislative history of the Ethics Act reveals that Congress
intended the Independent Counsel to conduct his prosecutorial responsibilities "independent from any control or supervision by the
Department of Justice."' 8 Indeed, the drafters appear to have determined that the purposes of the Ethics Act would be frustrated if the
two entities were functionally related to each other in any way,
"since the premise of the statute is that there is an institutional conflict of interest for the Department of Justice to conduct the investigation and prosecution" of matters under the Independent Counsel's
jurisdiction.59 Accordingly, notwithstanding the numerous references
in the legislative history to the Independent Counsel as an "inferior
officer," 60 Congress did not intend that he be inferior - in the constitutional sense of subordinate - to any other Officer of the United
States.
The legislative history of the 1982 reauthorization of the Independent Counsel statute further confirms that the Independent
Counsel was meant to be insulated from Executive Branch control.
Although the standard for removal of the Independent Counsel was
changed from "extraordinary impropriety" to "good cause," this was
not done to permit the Attorney General greater authority over his
operations, but instead to make use of the familiar standard of removal for independent agencies, rather than a standard thought to
be "undefinable" by Congress. 61 The degree of insulation of the Independent Counsel is evidenced by the Senate's intent with regard to
the requirement that the Independent Counsel follow established policies of the Department of Justice except where not possible.6 2 The
Senate Report stated that "this section should not be interpreted to
mean that failure of the special prosecutor to follow departmental
policies would constitute grounds for removal of the special prosecutor by the Attorney General."6 3 Such an interpretation "would seriously compromise the special prosecutor's independence."",
58. S. REP. No. 170 at 67, reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216,
4250. See also id. at 34; H.R. REP. No. 1307 at 2.
59. S. REP. No. 170 at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216,
4270.
60. See, e.g. H.R. REP. No. 1307 at 5; S. REP. No. 95-170 at 36, reprintedin 1978 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 4216, 4252.
61. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3553.

62.

28 U.S.C. § 594(0 (1982).

63. S. REP. No. 496 at 16, reprintedin 1982 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN, NEWS 3537,
3552,
64. Id.
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Given this evidence of legislative intent, the Independent Counsel statute cannot reasonably be interpreted to establish an Inferior
Officer.
Independent Counsel do not appear to view themselves as subject to Executive Branch authority. Independent Counsel Walsh has,
for instance, taken the position before this Court that in any disagreement with the President, or with the Secretary of State regarding the foreign policy implications of a prosecution, the Independent
Counsel's view prevails. 5 And, Independent Counsel Seymour insisted on pursuing a subpoena (unsuccessfully) against the Canadian
Ambassador despite strenuous opposition by the Department of
State on this diplomatic question." Thus, Independent Counsels purport to act unsupervised and essentially unchecked.
Moreover, the method of the Independent Counsel's appointment and his limited removability also demonstrate his superior officer status. This Court appoints an Independent Counsel and the
Attorney General may remove him "only for good cause, physical
disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance" of his duties.67 This removal is then
subject to review by the Special Division of this Court for errors of
fact or law.68
If this 'for cause' limitation is read quite broadly to mean that
the Attorney General may remove an Independent Counsel for disobedience of a lawful direction, the Independent Counsel would appear to be a subordinate. Such a reading would, however, be
squarely inconsistent with the congressional intent to create an Officer free from the Attorney General's influence.6 9 Unless the Court
is willing so to read the 'removal for cause' provision, the restrictive
statutory limitation on removal makes the Independent Counsel not
70
truly subordinate to anybody.
65. See Walsh Pits His Authority Against Executive Branch, UPI Wire Release, June
3, 1987 (available on NEXIS).

66. See United States v. Deaver, No. 87-096 (D.D.C. June 22, 1987).
67.

28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982).

68. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3)(1982).
69.

See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.

70. In In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. 1987), we successfully
urged a narrow, saving interpretation of a specific provision in the Act that arguably gave the

appointing court power to expand the jurisdiction of the independent counsel, 28 U.S.C. §
594(e)(1982). There was therefore no occasion specifically to consider whether the statutory
"good cause" provision governing removal of an independent counsel affords the Attorney
General sufficient authority over the independent counsel to obviate any constitutional difficulty with the latter's appointment by a court without Senate approval. Nor did the case

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1987

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:65

The limited subject matter and duration of an Independent
Counsel's responsibilities do not render him an Inferior Officer. The
duration of his assignment is not truly temporary because it extends
until the matter assigned is completed, regardless of how long that
takes.7 ' And, the fact that an Independent Counsel looks into only
one matter (which can be quite substantial, such as the Iran/Contra
matter) makes no difference for constitutional purposes either.
Rather, the key factor is that an Independent Counsel reigns supreme within his assigned area.
In sum, an Independent Counsel does not have the essential
quality of subordinancy that makes an Officer "inferior."
d. Apart from the question of whether an Independent Counsel
is subject to the authority of any Officer of the United States, and
Independent Counsel cannot be an Inferior Officer because he himself has the power under the Ethics Act to appoint Inferior Officers.
The Ethics Act provides Independent Counsel with the power to appoint Associate Independent Counsel.7 2 Since such associate counsel
presumably have the power to sign pleadings, to conduct grand juries, and to represent the Independent Counsel in court, they "exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States"
and therefore are officers of the United States. a Yet, the power to
appoint officers of the United States is explicitly reserved under the
Appointments Clause to the President, the courts of law, and
squarely present an issue concerning the validity, under the Appointments Clause, of the Independent Counsel's appointment by a court. We did clearly state in that brief, however, that it
would be inconsistent with our constitutional scheme for Congress to impose restrictions on the

President's ability to issue lawful directives to appointees charged with enforcing the criminal
laws. Brief for the United States at 23, In re Olsen 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div.

1987). We advanced a similar position in our testimony during the recent reauthorization
hearings, stating that in order to survive constitutional challenge, the independent counsel stat-

ute would have to allow removal for failure to comply with a lawful directive of the President
or his delegate, the Attorney General. Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government
Relations of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (April 23, 1987)(testimony of Assistant Attorney General John Bolton). As the text of this brief makes clear, our
examination of the statute in its entirety constrains us to the view that the existing removal

provision cannot reasonably be so construed.
71.

For this reason United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898) is inapposite. There,

the Court found that a Vice Consul General had been appropriately appointed to relieve the
Consul General who was ill, only until a new Consul General was named. In the case at bar,
the Independent Counsel is not merely serving temporarily until a permanent official can be

named.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c)(1982).
73. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. Similarly, Assistant United States Attorneys are also
Inferior Officers, who are appointed and removable by the head of the Department of Justice,

the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. § 542 (1982).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol16/iss1/5

46

et al.: The Constitutional Validity of the Ethics in Government Act: Morr
1987]

ETHICS ACT

"Heads of Departments." We have demonstrated that the Head of a
Department cannot be an Inferior Officer and must be appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Accordingly, the Independent Counsel's ability to appoint officers of the United States itself demonstrates that they are not Inferior Officers and, therefore, must be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.
2. Even if Independent Counsel are Inferior Officers, Permanent
Appointment Power Over Prosecutors Cannot be Assigned to the
Federal Courts. - If the Court rejects our argument above that the
unsupervised powers granted to the Independent Counsel cannot be
assigned by Congress to an Officer not appointed by the President
with the consent of the Senate, it should nevertheless strike down the
Ethics Act because the courts cannot appoint Independent Counsel
to carry out prosecutive functions. The Inferior Officer provision was
added with little debate towards the end of the Constitutional Convention, and there is nothing to indicate it was intended to destroy
the fundamental principles of separation of powers and the unitary
Executive so carefully crafted into the Constitution.
a. The Appointments Clause states that "Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments. 7' 4 This language says only that Congress can grant
federal courts the ability to appoint Inferior Officers; it does not by
its terms indicate that Congress can empower those courts to appoint
Officers in another Branch of the Government.
Nor does the history of the Inferior Officer provision support
allowing judges to appoint prosecutors. The provision was added late
in the Constitutional Convention with little discussion. After the
clause was proposed, Madison responded that it "does not go far
enough if it be necessary at all - Superior Officers below Heads of
Departments ought in some cases to have the appointment of lesser
offices."' 75 Gouverneur Morris then noted that "[tihere is no necessity. Blank Commissions can be sent _.,,16
The Framers thus believed that the Inferior Officer provision
74.

U.S. CoNsr. art II, § 2, cl.
2.

75.

2 M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at 627.

76. Id. The vote on this suggested provision was divided equally, and it therefore did not
then carry. However, Madison reports that "[i]t was urged that it be put a second time, some

such provision being too necessary, to be omitted[,] and on a second question it was agreed to
nem. con." Id. at 627-28.
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might have been unnecessary because it was assumed that Principal
Officers would have the power to appoint Inferior Officers to assist
them. The provision was nevertheless included so that it would be
clear that not all Officers of the United States perform in such a
manner that they need be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.
Debate on an earlier version of the Appointments Clause, which
did not then contain any explicit reference to Inferior Officers, confirms that the Framers envisioned that lower Officers would be appointed by their superiors within their own Branch. Rufus King commented upon the heavily debated suggested by George Mason that
there be a council to appoint Officers rather than having it done by
the President with the approval of the Senate. 7 King opposed that
idea, explaining that he did not think that the Senate would have to
sit constantly in order to fulfill its appointment approval duties: "He
did not suppose it was meant that all the minute officers were to be
appointed by the Senate, or any other original source, but by the
higher officers of the departments to which they belong."78 Thus,
there is nothing to suggest the Framers contemplated that judges
would be assigned the authority by Congress to appoint Officers to
perform executive functions.
b. Reading the Appointments Clause to allow judges to appoint
Inferior Officers primarily charged with executive tasks is directly
contrary to the principles of separation of powers and a single Executive accountable to the people. Therefore, this Clause must be interpreted to mean that the Executive Branch alone can appoint Officers whose primary function is criminal prosecution, an obviously
9
executive function.:
i. The Constitution does not pristinely divide governmental powers, but, to establish practically effective checks and balances, in limited and specific instances gives one Branch some authority in the
sphere of another.80 When the Framers were silent, however, the Su77. Id. at 539.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124 (Appointments Clause must be read consistently with
the separation of powers principle). "For judges to appoint their own clerks makes obvious
sense; for them to appoint State Department officials would seem quite inconsistent with the
Framers' notions of unified executive power. For them to appoint prosecutors ... offends the
separation of powers as well by giving judges too much influence over the prosecution." Currie,
The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 36 (footnotes omitted).
80. For example, the Senate must approve presidential appointments of all Principal
2. The President can
Officers, including Supreme Court justices. US. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
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preme Court has been unwilling to legitimate a mixture of powers on
its own fiat. "[T]he reasonable construction of the Constitution must
be that the branches should be kept separate in all cases in which
they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires."81 A
departure from this rule here - allowing judge to appoint prosecutors - would violate the separation of powers principle in a most
fundamental way. As Madison explained, for "the preservation of
liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its
own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of
each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of
the members of the others." 82
The Framers recognized that the President's power and duty to
execute the laws must carry with it the right to choose the
subordinate officers of government to assist him in that task:
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially
a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone
and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by
the assistance of subordinates .... As he is charged specifically to

take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his
executive power he should select those who were to act for him
83
under his direction in the execution of the laws.

The Framers' decision to vest the power of nomination and appointment of Officers in the President was consistent with their concept of a strong, unitary, and responsible Executive. A number of
delegates to the Convention expressed the fear that individual members of a numerous legislative body would not have the requisite
sense of personal responsibility for the selection of Officers. By contrast, the President was expected to be more capable of selecting a
suitable candidate and to be held accountable by the voters for his
choice. 4 As James Wilson commented: "Good laws are of no effect
without a good Executive; and there can be no good Executive withveto legislation, art. I, § 7, cl.
2, and Congress can impeach officers, including judges, art. I, §
3, cl.
6; art. II, § 4.
81. Myers, 272 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)(emphasis
added).
83. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135-36 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 117)(emphasis added).
84. See THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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out a responsible appointment of officers to execute. ' 5
This important purpose is severely undermined if appointments
are made by the one Branch of the Government that is not responsible to the voters through the democratic process. Certainly, the
courts should have the power to appoint Inferior Officers, such as
court clerks, who are necessary to make that Branch function properly. Hence, the Appointments Clause explicitly allows such appointments to be made by the courts of law. Nevertheless, separation of
powers and the unitary Executive, and the accountability these doctrines were designed to establish, are seriously eroded if Officers who
actually administer the law (such as prosecutors) are chosen, without
Senate approval, by members of the Judiciary, which is fully insulated from the democratic process.
ii. The prosecution of crimes is the duty of the Executive
Branch, not the courts, and hence there is no justification for treating prosecutors as the kind of Inferior Officers that courts may
appoint.
The Supreme Court has unequivocally affirmed that criminal
prosecution is an Executive Branch responsibility."8 This view is
plainly correct since the decision to prosecute a particular individual
involves taking the general legal prohibition enacted by Congress
and deciding whether and how to apply it to particular individuals
87
and sets of facts.
Further, the Attorney General is the specific Executive Branch
official to whom the daily execution of this power has been assigned
as the representative of the President." The Attorney General "is
85. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at 538-39. See generally id. at 41-44, 314-15. See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Id. No. 72, at 43536.
86. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion
to decide whether to prosecute a case")(citations omitted); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 202 (1928); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); Wilcox v. McConnel, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839). Accord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138.

87. By contrast, as the constitutional prohibition on bill of attainder, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3, shows, the legislative function is to pass the general law and not to provide for its
enforcement against a particular individual. The judicial function is then to judge whether the
attempted application of the law by the prosecutor is correct.
88. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, one of the earliest statutes passed by the First Congress, the offices of Attorney General and "attorney for the United States" in each judicial
district were created and assigned responsibilities for representing the interests of the United
States in court. The Attorney General was charged with the duty to "prosecute and conduct
all suits in the Supreme Court," while the "attorney[s] for the United States" were given the
"duty . . . to prosecute . . . all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the
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the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United
States in protection of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences, be faithfully executed." 89
The authority to enforce the laws vested in the Executive
Branch by the Constitution also carries with it the discretion not to
exercise that power in particular cases.90
The command of the Constitution committing the law enforcement power to the Executive Branch is not simply an allocation of
power consistent with political theory, but has a highly practical rationale. The executive powers assigned to the President by the Constitution are not discrete responsibilities to be exercised in a vacuum.
They are instead powers to be exercised in relation to each other.
For example, a decision to prosecute a particular individual may
raise issues of national security or foreign policy, which are matters
committed by the Constitution to the President.91 Such a decision
may implicate matters that a specially appointed Independent Counsel simply does not have the knowledge or expertise to consider
properly. 92
In short, the constitutional command to the President to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed does not mean that an unthinking policy of blind enforcement of every law at every time is
appropriate. 93 If that were the case, the entire concept of
authority of the United States ...." § 35, 1 Stat. 92, 93 (1789).

89. Ponzi, 258 U.S. at 262; see also Wilcox, 38 U.S. at 513 (the President acts through
department heads).

90. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965) (United States Attorney cannot be compelled by the courts to sign an indictment;
as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, courts are not to interfere with the
free exercise of the discretionary powers of the United States Attorneys); Newman v. United

States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (United States Attorney's decision to accept a plea
bargain from one defendant, but not from a co-defendant, was not reviewable; the U.S. Attorney's discretion, even if abused, could be reviewed only by his superiors). Accord United States

v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
91.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Indeed, it has

been widely reported recently that the North Independent Counsel has taken actions with
possible significant effects on relations with Israel, one of our closest allies. And, as noted

earlier, the Deaver Independent Counsel became embroiled in a controversy with the Canadian
Ambassador, a person representing one of this nation's most significant trading and military
partners. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
92. In Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985), then-Judge
Scalia, writing for this Court, concluded that implying a private right of action from the Neu-

trality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982), would destroy the Executive's ability to exercise
prosecutorial discretion, an ability especially necessary in cases touching upon foreign

relations.
93.

An example of the legitimate considerations to be balanced by the Executive in de-
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prosecutorial discretion and grants of immunity would be of questionable validity under the Constitution. The Constitution vests the
Executive Branch with the discretion to weigh these types of considerations and to make appropriate choices. That discretion is so wellestablished that it is unreviewable, save in those narrow circumstances where it results in a selective prosecution based on constitutionally prohibited criteria. 4 How well or poorly the Executive's
prosecutorial discretion is exercised is a matter for the voters to decide, or, in appropriate instances, for Congress through the impeachment process.
In the Ethics Act a well-recognized Executive Branch function
of taking care that the laws are faithfully executed has been invalidly assigned to an Officer not appointed by that Branch. The Independent Counsel is a prosecutor who has not been chosen because he
is believed by the Executive Branch to be a capable person who will
properly carry out his responsibilities. Additionally, if a particular
Independent Counsel is found to be a bad choice and does a poor
job, there is no democratic accountability. The voters certainly cannot affix blame on the Executive or Legislative Branches, and they
are unable to express their displeasure through the ballot box against
this Court, which actually made the appointment.
iii. The principles of separation of powers and the unitary Executive established by the Framers cannot be ignored in this instance
on the basis of a 'necessity' argument. The theory used to support
the Ethics Act is that the Executive Branch will not investigate and
prosecute its own high ranking members, and this 'flaw' in the system established by the Framers must be rectified by reading the Appointments Clause in a way that would otherwise be contrary to the
clear tenor of the remainder of the Constitution.95
Nearly identical reasoning was urged in Buckley after Congress
had there too attempted to give the Appointments Clause a new
meaning. Supporters of the legislation in Buckley contended that
termining the nature and course of a prosecution was provided by Professor Archibald Cox.
Discussing cases in which prosecutorial discretion may properly be exercised, Professor Cox
cited as an example a decision by President Theodore Roosevelt not to prosecute United States
Steel Corporation for an antitrust violation because such an action would impair business confidence during a period of recovery from the financial panic of 1907. Removing Politicsfrom
the Administration of Justice: Hearings before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 202 (1974).
94. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
95. See S. REP. No. 170 at 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4216, 4221.
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deviation from normal constitutional principles was necessary because of perceived conflicts of interest for the President in enforcing
law. The Supreme Court expressly declined to accept this reasoning,
"however rational," to justify "a distortion of the Framers' work."96
In this case the "distortion of the Framers' work" would be considerably greater than that unsuccessfully urged in Buckley since the
Framers already provided for the problem sought to be addressed by
the Ethics Act. The Framers explicitly provided for impeachment of
all civil Officers if they commit "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors. 97
There can be no true concern that the Ethics Act is needed to
expose wrongdoing by high level public officials which would otherwise go unrevealed. Congress itself possesses ample oversight responsibility and is fully capable of conducting necessary investigations.9 8
Thus, Congress has the power to bring wrongdoing to light so that
the voters can then determine whether law enforcement officers chosen by the Executive Branch are properly fulfilling their
responsibilities.99
Furthermore, the Executive Branch is fully capable of appointing Officers of sufficient quality and independence who will fulfill their duties even if it means pursuing charges against high ranking officials.100 The regular investigative and prosecutorial organs of
the Justice Department have been effectively used in instances involving wrongdoing by high ranking officials. Vice President Agnew,
for example, was prosecuted through the offices of the United States
96. 424 U.S. at 134. Indeed, 'necessity' arguments will almost always be made in cases
involving attempts to avoid the separation of powers. The Supreme Court has found them

unconvincing. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944; Bowsher, 106 U.S. at 3193.
97. U. S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
98. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Investigation of the Attorney
General, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (investigating the alleged failure of the Attorney General to prosecute or defend certain criminal and civil actions).
99. Ensuring actual punishment of wrongdoers whom the President wants to protect
cannot be the true goal of the Ethics Act since the statute leaves intact the President's unrestricted constitutional pardon power. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
100. Congress has created Inspector General Offices in departments of the Executive

Branch, Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 987-93 (1982), and we are not aware of evidence that the persons chosen by the Exec-

utive Branch to fill these positions have abdicated their responsibilities. The Department of
Justice itself has an Office of Professional Responsibility charged with investigating wrongdo-

ing by departmental officials, regardless of their possible exalted status. 28 C.F.R. § 0.39
(1987). Congress too has provided statutory protection for 'whistleblowers' who expose im-

proper conduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (b)(1)(B) (1982).
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Attorney,' 0 ' In those rare circumstances in which independence from
the normal processes of the Department is necessary, steps can be
taken to provide for appointment of an Independent Counsel with
the authority of an Inferior Officer. Such steps were taken in the
Watergate prosecutions and, more recently, in the Iran-Contra and
Nofziger investigations. 0 2 If the situation demands the full authority
of a principal "Officer of the United States," the President may proceed through appointment of such an Officer.' 0 3
At bottom, the 'necessity' argument contends that Congress can
intrude upon an Executive Branch function such as criminal law
prosecution whenever it perceives that the coordinate branch is confronted by an inherent conflict of interest. In other words, it is assertedly consistent with our system of separated powers for one
Branch or combination of Branches to assume or limit the functions
of another Branch when that third Branch is 'disqualified' from performing that function itself. However, each Branch of government,
even when arguably beset by a conflict of interest, has always retained hegemony over matters within its domain. For instance, the
judiciary has without exception adjudicated "cases and controversies" involving judges, despite occasional attacks that the impartiality of the courts could not be trusted. 4 Similarly, Congress sets its
own pay and determines the conditions under which itself and its
members can be sued, without any effective check from the Executive or Judicial Branch. Congress, like the Executive, is responsible
to the the people and must determine to its own satisfaction that the
actions in these areas are appropriate.
c. In an early ruling on appointment of Inferior Officers, the
Supreme Court held that federal judges can appoint and remove
court clerks.' 5 In so holding, the Court explained that "[t]he ap101.
102.

See United States v. Agnew, 428 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Md. 1977).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50

(D.C. Cir. 1987). An Independent Counsel was also appointed by Attorney General Bell to
investigate the relationship between the Carter Warehouse and the National Bank of Georgia.
44 Fed. Reg. 25837 (1979).
103. For example, President Coolidge appointed, with the consent of the Senate, two
attorneys as special counsel to investigate wrongdoing in connection with the Teaport Dome
leases. See Act of Feb. 8, 1924, ch. 16, 43 Stat. 5-6. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135 (1927). The investigation ultimately resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the former Secretary of the Interior.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980); Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (under the 'rule of neces-

sity,' courts are required to remain arbiters over the judges' pay claims).
105. Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
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pointing power ... was no doubt intended to be exercised by the

department of the government to which the officer to be appointed
most appropriatelybelonged."106 Thus, the Supreme Court initially
gave the Inferior Officer provision the reading most consistent with
the overall intent of the Constitution. 07
Forty years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the Inferior Officer provision, this time within the context of a challenge to
the ability of Congress to empower the courts to appoint federal
election supervisors, who were charged with observing elections to
guard against fraud.10 8 The Court rejected a challenge to the statute
on the ground that it was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized
courts to appoint election supervisors whose duties were allegedly executive in nature.10 9 The Court explained that it "is no doubt usual
and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular
executive department to which the duties of such offices appertain."110 However, there is no absolute requirement to that effect in
the Appointments Clause, and "it would be difficult in many cases to
determine to which department an office properly belonged.", 11 The
Court concluded 112 that Congress can determine where to vest Inferior Officer appointment power, governed by the principle set out in
Hennen. Such a congressional decision would be void, however, if
there is an "incongruity of duty required" of the Inferior Officer and
of the appointing Branch." 3
Significantly, the duties of the Officer at stake in Siebold - an
election supervisor - were not found to fit exclusively within any of
the Executive departments. The Court accordingly upheld the ap106.

38 U.S. at 257-58 (emphasis added).

107. In Collins, 14 Ct. Cl. at 575, the court addressed Congress' power to vest authority
in the President to reinstate a military officer. The court explained that the Inferior Officer

provision permits the President, the Heads of Departments, and the courts of law to appoint
"any of their respective subordinate officers ....
Id. (emphasis added).
108. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
109. 100 U.S. at 397.
110. Id.

111. Id.
112.

Id. at 397-398.

113. Id. at 398. The Court in dictum discussed the appointment of a United States
Marshal, and opined that such an Officer could be appointed by a court. Id. at 397. Assuming

that this dictum is correct, such an appointment would constitute less of an intrusion into
Executive Branch affairs than does judicial appointment of Independent Counsel because, unlike Independent Counsels, Marshals are under the direct supervision of the Attorney General,

28 U.S.C. § 569(c)(1982), and can be removed at the will of the Executive. In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1, 63 (1890).
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pointment power in the courts.114 Unlike in Siebold, the Officer at
issue here - a prosecutor - is manifestly part of the Executive
Branch alone. 1 5 There is no confusion, as there was in Siebold, as to
which Branch should properly be appointing prosecutors. 16 Thus, if
this Court can appoint a prosecutor, it can just as easily be empowered to appoint pardon officials or generals. Yet, those officials carry
out obvious executive functions." 1
Because the function at issue is a prosecutorial one, there is also
an obvious incongruity of duties, proscribed by Siebold, between
those of the appointing Branch and those of the appointed Officer.
As explained earlier," 8 the courts have made clear on numerous occasions that the separation of powers principle prohibits judges from
interfering with prosecutorial discretion, which often involves consideration of broad Executive Branch issues."l 9 Moreover in United
States v. Thompson,'20 the Supreme Court reversed a lower court
for attempting to prevent a United States Attorney from instituting
a prosecution by resubmitting the matter to a grand jury. The
Court's decision was expressly based upon "the right of the Government to initiate prosecutions for crime," a right not subject to control by judicial decision. 121 Furthermore, the duty of the prosecutor
cannot be linked to the duty of the judge lest the due process rights
of the defendant be infringed. An obvious and troubling conflict is
114. 100 U.S. at 398.
115. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
116. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987), the
Supreme Court ruled that the courts may appoint attorneys for the special purpose of prosecuting contempt actions. This ruling is irrelevant here because this power was viewed as an
integral part of the courts' inherent Article III authority to ensure respect for the courts and
the judicial process. Id. at 2131-34.
117. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
147-48 (1871).
118. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
119. We also note that the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 n. 31 (1982), rejected an argument that the newly created
bankruptcy judges were adjuncts of the district courts, in part on the ground that the new
judges were appointed by the President rather than by the district courts. The plurality thus
viewed it as significant that the invalid bankruptcy judges had been appointed by another
Branch.
120. 251 U.S. 407 (1920).
121. Id. at 415. Similarly, in Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932), the Supreme
Court held that a district court lacks jurisdiction to refuse to issue an arrest warrant following
an indictment by a grand jury. See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)
(construing statute authorizing U.S. Attorney to confer immunity in a way to avoid serious
constitutional questions that would arise from providing judicial review of prosecutorial immunity determinations).
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raised when this Court must judge actions taken by a prosecutor
whom other judges of this same Court have selected because they
believe him to be the person best qualified to be the prosecutor in
122
that particular case.
Consequently, there is an incongruity of functions between
judges and a prosecutor and the result in Siebold does not resolve
this case, which is instead "governed" 123 by the rule set out in Hennen that Inferior Officers are to be appointed by the Branch to which
they belong if, as in this case, that Branch can easily be identified. 124
B. Investing the Special Division of this Court with NonJudicial Powers Violates Article III of the Constitution
1. Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial Power" of
the United States to "Cases" and "Controversies. 1 25 "[T]he 'case or
controversy' requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch
the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded. 1 26 The power of the judiciary to act, therefore, must be
based on the exercise of the adjudicative function, and on the presence of a concrete dispute between adverse parties. 27
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress may
not impose non-judicial duties upon the federal judiciary. In
Hayburn's Case, the Court held that courts cannot be assigned the
task of recommending to the Secretary of War whether Revolution122. Congress has provided in the past for interim court appointment of United States
Attorneys when the position is vacant. 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1982). However, that statute has
recently been amended to recognize the primary role of the Attorney General in filling such

vacancies. 100 Stat. 3616 (1986). Unlike Independent Counsels, United States Attorneys are
removable at will by the President, and serve under the direct supervision of the Attorney

General. Finally, this vacancy appointment practice has never been addressed by the Supreme
Court. But see United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(appointment of
an interim United States Attorney by federal district court judge does not violate separation of
powers doctrine).
123.

100 U.S. at 398.

124. 38 U.S. at 258. In Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (threejudge court), over the dissent of Judge J. Skelly Wright, the court upheld judicial appointment

of the members of the District of Columbia school board. As the court noted, however, the
federal court in that location exercises unique article I power over the District of Columbia.

Id. at 909-11. Moreover, there was not the same obvious incongruity of functions that is present here. We also note that in Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973), the court
criticized judicial appointment of independent prosecutors, recognizing the incongruity of functions between judges and prosecutors.
125. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
126. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
127. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 40 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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ary War veterans were owed pensions. In the note to the report of
the case, Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge
Duane agreed that "neither the Legislative nor the Executive
branches, can constitutionally assign to the Judicial [branch] any
duties, but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed in a
' u28
judicial manner.
Similarly, the Court in Ferreiraheld that Congress cannot invest courts with law administration duties. The Court there determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from the district
court given that the power invested in the district court "is not judicial ... in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States. ' 129 Rather, the task was
that which could be assigned to a claims commissioner and "[tihe
proceeding is altogether ex parte; and all that the judge is required
to do, is to receive the claim when the party presents it, and to adjust
it upon such evidence as he may have before him, or be able himself
to obtain."'130
The rule prohibiting courts from discharging non-judicial tasks
flows from two interrelated aspects of the Constitution's separation
of powers framework. First, requiring courts to perform executive
tasks or to act as legislative commissioners would undercut "the
Framers' desire to safeguard the independence of the judicial from
the other branches by confining its activities to 'cases of a judicial
nature.' ,,131 Second, the discharge of other tasks would "involve the
judges too intimately in the process of policy and thereby weaken
128. 2 U.S. at 410.
129. 54 U.S. at 48.
130. 54 U.S. at 46. See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)(holding that the judiciary cannot pass on awards of international
air routes by the Civil Aeronautics Board since any decision would ultimately be subject to
modification by the President).
131. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (quoting
2 M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at 430). See also Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 411 (opinion of
Justices Wilson, Blair, and District Judge Peters); Speech of John Marshall to the House of
Representatives, 18 U.S. (5Wheat.) App. 3, 16 (expansion of judicial power beyond cases or
controversies would usurp the power and independence of the other Branches and "[tihe division of power [among the Branches] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be
swallowed up by the judiciary"); J. ADAMS, Thoughts on Government, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 198 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851) ("The dignity and stability of government in all its
branches, the morals of the people, and every blessing of society depend so much upon an
upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial powers ought to be distinct from
both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon
both, as both should be checks upon that.").
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confidence in the disinterestedness of their judicatory functions." 1 2
Aligning the judiciary with either of the two other Branches poses
not only a threat to the remaining Branch, but also erodes one of the
safeguards for individual liberty - an independent, objective judiciary. 133 Empowering this Court to discharge the duties prescribed in
the Ethics Act violates both of these precepts because it undermines
the Executive's constitutional prerogative to enforce the laws, and
jeopardizes the structural protections afforded targets of criminal
law enforcement investigations."3
2. Under the Ethics Act, Congress has invested this Court
with wide-ranging powers that have no roots in any particular case
or controversy.
a. Congress plainly intended that the Special Division exercise a
non-judicial role in defining the Independent Counsel's prosecutorial
jurisdiction.13 5 The Senate Report explained that
[i]n defining the prosecutorial jurisdiction of a special prosecutor,
the division of the court is given the authority to define that jurisdiction to extend to related matters. For example, if allegations of
criminal wrongdoing involve a cabinet secretary, and for that reason an application is made for the appointment of a special prosecutor undersubsection 592(c), the court would probably want to define the prosecutorial jurisdiction to include any potential coconspirators ....16

Indeed, "even if the Attorney General should not request that related matters be assigned to an existing special prosecutor, the court
132. F. FRANKFURTER, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 475-78 (1930). See
IN AMERICA 99 (G. Lawrence trans. 1966).
133. Cf. In re Application of President's Commission on Organized Crime, Subpoena of
Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 1985)(inclusion of federal judges on the President's
Commission on Organized Crime violated separation of powers doctrine in that Commission
members must "adopt a pro-government perspective" which is inconsistent with the requirement of impartiality).
134. A far different question is presented by individual judges who volunteer to discharge administrative authority at the behest of one of the other Branches. Individual judges
have long carried out non-judicial duties in a variety of contexts - John Jay was Ambassador
to England at the same time he was the First Chief Justice, and Justice Jackson served at the
Nuremburg War Crimes Trials. See In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, Subpoena
of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 377 (3d Cir. 1986). Such voluntary actions have never been thought
to raise separation of the powers problems. Here, Congress clearly could not have lodged the
power to appoint and supervise an Independent Counsel in judges as individuals, for any such
assignment would violate the Appointments Clause.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982).
136. S.REP. No. 170 at 64, reprintedin 1978 US. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4280.
also A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
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has the authority to do so . .. .,11
Thus, Congress has assigned this Court a policymaking role in
determining whether, or to what extent, to modify the Attorney General's original grant of jurisdiction to the Independent Counsel. Indeed, the Special Division exercised that power in the case involving
Lieutenant Colonel North, defining the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction to include more events and persons than those included
in the
138
Attorney General's application under 28 U.S.C. 592(c)-(d).
b. Moreover, Congress authorized the Special Division "on its
own motion" to terminate the investigation on the ground that the
investigation is substantially or fully complete.139 The House Report
explained that this termination provision was "intended to deal with
situations where a special prosecutor is attempting
to prolong his of1 40
fice beyond the time it is really needed.9
Determining whether an Independent Counsel is "really
needed" is far removed from the exercise of the adjudicative function, and the Senate report acknowledges that the Ethics Act gives
the Court the administrative option to impose the "drastic remedy of
terminating the office [of Independent Counsel]" when the court believes that the essential responsibilities of the Independent Counsel
have been completed.1 41 As with the provisions allowing the Court

discretion in setting the contours of the Independent Counsel's investigation, the termination provision plainly calls for the Court's exercise of non-judicial duties.142
137. Id. at 65, reprinted in 1978 US. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4281.
138. See In re Oliver L. North, No. 86-6, Order of Dec. 19, 1986 (D.C. Cir. Indep.
Counsel Div.). See also In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 65 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams J.,
concurring and dissenting)(noting that the Special Division's decision to vest greater authority
in Independent Counsel than that proposed by the Attorney General followed a letter from
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee urging the Court to expand the investigation;
"[u]nhitching the Independent Counsel from the executive may make the office naturally
prone to domination by the branch that represents its primary competitor").
139. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)(1982).
140. H.R. REP. No. 1307 at 11.
141. S.REP.No. 170 at 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216,
4291.
142. Courts, of course, may discharge non-judicial functions in managing the business of
the judiciary and in keeping their "own house in order." Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 (1970); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783
F.2d 1488, 1503-1506 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Goldbold, 106 S.Ct.
3273 (1986). Similarly, federal courts may exercise a type of prosecutive authority in vindicating their own integrity through exercise of the criminal contempt power. See Young, 107 S.Ct.
at 2131-2134; Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The duties that
this Court discharges under the Ethics Act, however, in no way relate to the management of
judicial business.
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125

The Court's exercise of such functions under the Ethics Act
cannot be defended as an outgrowth of the constitutionally legitimate judicial function in overseeing aspects of an inchoate case or
controversy between the Independent Counsel and the targets of the
investigation. The power to determine whether probable cause exists
justifying issuance of a search warrant is far different from the
power to establish and/or terminate a prosecutor's investigation.
This Court does not act pursuant to the Ethics Act as the guardian
of the target's rights, but solely to effectuate the congressional aims
underlying the Independent Counsel provisions, regardless of the target's interests.1 43
3. The principle articulated in Ferreiraand Hayburn's Case
that Congress cannot impose non-judicial functions upon the courts
- is a mirror image of the more recent Supreme Court cases
stressing the restrictions upon congressional efforts to influence administration of the laws through means other than legislation.
In INS v. Chadha,144 and in Bowsher v. Synar,145 the Supreme
Court made clear that Congress can directly affect those outside its
Branch only by passing laws. In striking down the legislative veto
provision in Chadha, the Court held that Congress had impermissibly taken action, outside the constitutionally prescribed means,
which "alter[ed] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha [a private party], all outside the Legislative Branch. 1 46
Similarly, in Bowsher, the Court held that the Comptroller
General, an officer of Congress, cannot consistent with our system of
separated powers exercise the administrative authority invested in
him under the Gramm-Rudman Act. The Court reaffirmed that "as
Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting leg-

143.

Congress also invested this Court with the responsibility to determine whether vari-

ous developments in the prosecution should be made public when the "best interests of justice"
so require. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1982). Similarly, § 595(b)(3) provides that the Court shall
make the Independent Counsel's progress reports public as it "deems appropriate." See also 28
U.S.C. § 596(a)(2)(1982) (same authority with respect to a report concerning the Attorney
General's decision to remove an Independent Counsel). In the context of a case or controversy,
courts may determine whether releasing information to the public furthers the public interest.
Here, however, Congress has directed this Court to make such determinations on its own mo-

tion in the absence of any adversarial process. The reporting provisions thus reflect Congress'
decision to make the Special Division a partner of the Independent Counsel in conducting the

investigation and safeguarding what the Court perceives to be in the public interest.
144. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

145.

106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).

146.

462 U.S. at 952.
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islation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the
execution of its enactment only indirectly - by passing new
legislation. u 47
Just as Congress may directly affect the rights of individuals
and the other Branches only through constitutional prescribed means
of legislation, so Congress can empower the judiciary to affect such
rights only through its constitutionally prescribed power of adjudicating cases and controversies. Here, Congress, as in Chadha and
Bowsher, has empowered a Branch other than the Executive to exercise administrative authority affecting the legal rights of the Executive Branch and of private individuals as well. The danger to the
balance of powers presented by the court's assumption of such tasks
under the Ethics Act is far from academic.
The powers invested in the Special Division - to define the Independent Counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, to determine whether
to release certain information to the public, and to decide whether to
terminate the office of Independent Counsel - not only usurp the
policymaking authority of the Executive Branch,14 8 they also remove
the systemic protections afforded to the criminally accused. By empowering the Special Division to participate in the prosecutorial
function, Congress has threatened to erode the "structural protections against abuse of power [that are] critical to preserving
14
liberty."
C.

The Ethics Act Unconstitutionally Vests Executive Power in
an Independent Counsel Outside the Executive's Control

The Constitution places in the Executive Branch alone the
power and responsibility to enforce the law.1 50 The Ethics Act, however, seeks to carve part of that constitutionally-assigned power out
of the Executive Branch and to vest it with Independent Counsels
who are appointed by the Judicial Branch and who operate almost
entirely independently of Executive Branch control. This result is
contrary to the allocation of powers provided by the Constitution.
1. The First Congress implemented the concept of the unitary
Executive in the "Decision of 1789." In urging that the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs would be subject to removal by the President at will,
Madison explained that, inasmuch as the President has the responsi147.
148.
149.
150.

106 S. Ct. at 3192.
See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 28-41, 88-96 and accompanying text.
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bility for faithful execution of the laws, he necessarily must have the
authority to remove those officials he does not trust. 1 51 Additionally,
Madison referred to the "great principle of unity and responsibility
in the Executive Department, which was intended for the security of
liberty and the public good."' 152
In keeping with the concept of a unitary Executive, the Supreme Court has recognized that the President must have the power
to supervise and, if necessary, remove subordinates appointed to assist him in the exercise of his executive power.1 53 In a series of cases,
the Court has addressed the degree to which the President must have
authority to remove governmental officials in order to discharge the
constitutional power to execute the laws properly. While the Court's
analysis has changed somewhat through time, one principle underlies
each of the Court's decisions: the degree of Executive Branch control
required over a particular office is determined by the nature of the
authority exercised by that office. It is our position that Officers exercising such a quintessential executive power as criminal law enforcement must be subject to full Executive Branch control and
removal.
In Myers v. United States,1 54 the Supreme Court engaged in an
exhaustive analysis of judicial and legislative precedent on the question of removal of Officers. It affirmed that Congress cannot interfere with the President's performance of his duty to execute the laws
by curtailing his control over the subordinates whom he has appointed to assist him in that task. 55 The Court acknowledged the
reality that "the President alone and unaided could not execute the
56
laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates."'
Further, the Court recognized that the concept of a unitary Executive requires that the President have control over those
subordinates. 5
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,1 58 the Court upheld
151.
152.
153.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 462-65, 496-501 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Id.at 499.
As Hamilton explained: "The persons ... to whose immediate management [the

administration of government is] committed ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account they ought to derive their offices from his
appointment, [or] at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence." THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 436 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
154. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
155. Id.at 162-163.
156. Id.at 117.
157. Id. at 135.
158. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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a statutory limitation providing that the President could remove an
FTC Commissioner for inefficiency, malfeasance, or neglect of duty.
The Court thereby limited its prior opinion in Myers. It continued,
however, to focus on the nature of the duties assigned to the particular official in order to determine whether the Constitution requires
that the President have unlimited removal power:
Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing
a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming
the power of the President alone to make the removal, is confined
159
to purely executive officers ....
In Wiener v. United States, 60 the President sought to remove a

member of a temporary commission established to adjudicate war
claims. The Supreme Court concluded that "the most reliable factor
for drawing an inference regarding the President's power of removal
in our case is the nature of the function that Congress vested in the
War Claims Commission."' 61 Finding the function of the commission to have an "intrinsic judicial character,"' 2 the Court concluded
that the President had no removal power under the Constitution or
by statute.' 6
Most recently, in Bowsher v. Synar,'6 the Supreme Court determined that certain budgetary functions cannot be assigned to the
Comptroller General, an official subject to removal for cause by
Congress. In so holding, the Court stressed that the nature of the
powers delegated to the office control the nature and location of the
removal power.
Underlying each of these decisions is the recurring theme that
executive power must reside in the Executive Branch in the hands of
159. Id. at 631-32 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to hold that the FTC
does not exercise executive power, but "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" power instead.
Id. at 627-28. This case does not involve such distinctions of governmental powers as discussed
above, the power involved here is unquestionably executive in nature.
160. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
161. Id. at 353.
162. Id. at 355.
163. Id. at 356. By contrast, in Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941), the court found that the TVA exercises "predominantly an executive or administrative function." Id. at 993. Accordingly, the court concluded that the President has the inherent power to remove the chairman of the Board of Directors of the TVA,
notwithstanding an apparent intent by Congress to limit the President's removal authority and
preserve such authority for itself. Id. at 992-94.
164. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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officials subject to executive control and supervision. Simply put,
since the Constitution vests the executive power in the President,
those officials who exercise that power must, consistent with the
Constitution, be subject to Executive Branch control and direction.
As the Supreme Court has stated, the President is "entrusted with
supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity[,] ... includ[ing] the enforcement of federal law ... and man-

agement of the Executive Branch - a task for which 'imperative
reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important
duties.'

"165

2. It is indisputable that criminal prosecution, the Independent
Counsels' primary task, is a quintessential executive function.166
Consequently, the Ethics Act violates the Constitution insofar as it
vests a significant portion of this executive law enforcement authority in an office effectively insulated from Executive Branch appointment, control, supervision, and removal.
Prosecution of high level officials often requires a careful balancing of such factors as the results to be obtained, the resources
required, foreign policy implications, the extent to which national security information may be revealed, as well as a host of other considerations.1 17 Such factors cannot properly be considered in isolation.
The whole concept of a unitary Executive is undermined if these decisions are made by different Independent Counsel with no democratic accountability, each concerned solely about his own view of
the nation's interests as defined by his narrow prosecutorial
jurisdiction.
The Ethics Act, however, places enforcement of the criminal
law outside the control of the President or the Attorney General.
The sole effective function assigned to the Executive Branch under
the Ethics Act is the charge to the Attorney General to conduct a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted. 6 Upon such a finding, or even the failure to conclude the
required investigation within ninety days, the function of the Executive ceases, even if the case contains important and legitimate factors
165. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982)(quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 134135).

166. See supra notes 28-41, 88-96 and accompanying text.
167.
168.

See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 592 (1982).
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which would otherwise lead to the exercise of the discretion not to
proceed with a prosecution.
Like the President's powers in foreign affairs,"'9 the pardon
17 1
power,1 70 and the power of the President over the military,

the President's authority to enforce the criminal laws flows directly
from the Constitution and may not be so seriously undermined by
legislation.1 72 The Executive Branch's authority to enforce the crimi-

nal laws is such a key part of the executive function that it cannot be
assigned to an Officer who is so clearly outside the control and supervision of that Branch.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act regarding Independent Counsels is unconstitutional.

169. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
170. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
171. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
172. This problem with taking away the President's law enforcement authority was
noted by legislators during early consideration of what became the Ethics Act. See, e.g.,
Baker, The ProposedJudicially Appointed Independent Office of Public Attorney: Some Constitutional Objections and an Alternative, 29 Sw. LJ. 671 (1975).
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